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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters that fall under the broad banner of applied
microeconomics.
The first chapter analyses the role of the 2008 amendment to the USA Lacey Act
in combatting international trade in illegal timber. Comparing US timber imports
over time and across countries and products, I show that the US timber imports fell
after the introduction of the Lacey Act. I find the fall in timber imports is accompa-
nied by a fall in illegal trade as measured by the difference between importer and
exporter reported statistics. Finally, using the case of Indonesia, I provide suggestive
evidence in favor of a reduction in deforestation as a result of the policy.
The second chapter analyzes the effect of a year long rolling blackout in Colom-
bia on mothers’ short and long run fertility behavior and socioeconomic outcomes.
We use an extensive period of power rationing in Colombia throughout 1992 as a
natural experiment and exploit exogenous spatial variation in the intensity of power
rationing as an instrumental variable. We show that power rationing induced a
“mini baby boom” nine months later. In particular, it increased the probability that
a mother had a baby by five percent. Women who were exposed to the shock and
had an additional child find themselves in worse socio-economic conditions more
than a decade later.
The third chapter documents the way in which the types of people who are ad-
mired has changed, arguing that the responses to this question tells us something
about the way in which society has been evolving - the 65 years of data are proba-
bly the longest consistent series on social attitudes. We present robust correlations
between admiration and trust, allowing us to provide information on trends in trust
on a consistent basis back to the late 1940s, earlier than most other data sources.
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Preface
This thesis is composed of three independent chapters. My family background in
the timber industry inspires the first chapter. Having business interests in sawmilling
and exports of timber, I have seen several policy attempts in my country aimed at
enhancing sustainable timber trade. This chapter tries to highlight the effective-
ness of consumer country policies in combatting illegal timber trade, particularly in
countries with weak institutions. I study a broad based policy measure, namely the
Lacey Act of 1900, or simply the Lacey Act. In 2008, USA amended the Lacey Act,
making US firms accountable for importing timber considered illegal according to
exporter country laws. I use trade data to shed light on the role of the Lacey Act
in reducing the global trade in illegal timber. Being the largest single importer of
timber in the world, the USA provides an excellent case study on consumer country
enforcement.
First, using different counterfactual exercises, I show that timber imports to the
US fell significantly after the introduction of the Lacey Act. Next, motivated from
the literature on illicit trade, I use the difference between importer and exporter
reported statistics and show a significant and meaningful fall in illegal timber trade
post the introduction of the Lacey Act. Furthermore, I show that this relationship is
significantly higher in countries with higher levels of corruption. Finally, I present
a direct link between the Lacey Act and deforestation. Looking at Indonesia, a
country with high level of illegal timber exports, I study the impact of the Lacey Act
on deforestation rates within the country. The chapter builds a strong case for the
role of consumer countries in combatting the global trade in endangered species,
illegal goods and other items of sensitive nature.
The second chapter (joint with Thiemo Fetzer and Oliver Pardo) is motivated
from my personal experience of facing many blackouts growing up. Coming from
a developing country, blackouts are a common feature, especially during times of
droughts as majority of power is hydro driven. This has led to the creation of
the urban legend “whether procreation increases when lights go out”, capturing the
imagination of demographers, sociologists, and social scientists for a long time. This
chapter tries to address this urban legend by specifically studying one dimension of
the social cost of bad public infrastructure in developing countries. We analyzes the
effect of a year long rolling blackout in Colombia on mothers’ short and long run
fertility behavior and socioeconomic outcomes.
We formalize an intuitive idea that blackouts decrease the opportunity cost of
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sex, leading to more children, which in turn increases the opportunity cost of school-
ing and accumulation of other assets in general. We find statistical evidence in
support of a “mini baby boom” nine months later. In particular, it increased the
probability that a mother had a baby by five percent. More importantly, not all
women are able to adjust their lifetime fertility. We estimate that every tenth baby
born due to the power rationing was not adjusted for 12 years later, resulting in an
overall increase in total fertility. This increase has indirect social costs for mothers
who are not able to adjust their lifetime fertility. They find themselves with worse
socioeconomic conditions more than a decade later. Overall, the chapter suggests
that energy infrastructure investment has to account for the social returns it gets
from reduced fertility.
The third chapter (joint with Alan Manning) is inspired by the human desire to
seek for role models. We compile and analyze data from the annual Gallup Opinion
Poll, which asks an open-ended question on who do you admire the most? This
exercise is interesting for a number of reasons. First, the description of the way
in which the responses have changed can tell us something interesting about the
way social attitudes have been evolving over 65 years. Arguably this is the longest
run of data on social attitudes on a consistent basis that exists. Second, we argue on
theoretical grounds and show using empirical analysis that admiration can be linked
to trust, and specifically that admiring the president is strongly related to trust in
government. Using this link we can provide information on trends in trust on a
consistent basis back to the late 1940s, earlier than most other data sources. Third,
the chapter investigates the link between admiration and media mentions. We show
a robust correlation between number of mentions in newspapers in a particular year
and state and the likelihood of being admired, highlighting the link between media,
culture and social capital.
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Chapter 1
Blocking Illegal Trade: The US
Lacey Act
The goal of this chapter is to examine if consumer country enforcement can reduce
illegal trade in timber. Illegal trade in timber has serious economic, environmental
and social impacts. In addition to loss of government revenue and local economic
development, illegal trade can undermine environmentally sustainable activities. In
the extreme case, it can undermine the rule of law and lead to resource misalloca-
tion, armed conflict in fragile states or be a source of financing civil conflicts (see
for example Alemagi and Kozak, 2010; Baker et al., 2004; Goncalves et al., 2012). To
put this in perspective, estimates suggest that illegal trade in wildlife and timber
amount to 30-70 billion US dollars per year, equivalent to perhaps 10-20% of the
value of the illegal trade in narcotics or 15-30% of the value of the trade in counter-
feit goods (OECD, 2012). This problem is heightened when source countries have
week institutions. In Indonesia, for example, between 60 to 80% of wood yield may
involve some illegality (Burgess et al. (2012)).
In recent years consumer countries have tried to exclude illegal (and sometimes
unsustainable) timber products from international trade through the use of regula-
tory measures. In this chapter, I study a broad based policy measure, namely the
Lacey Act of 1900, or simply the Lacey Act. The Lacey Act is a conservation law
in the United States that prohibits trade in wildlife, fish, and plants that have been
illegally taken, possessed, transported or sold. On May 22, 2008, the Lacey Act
was amended to include the originally tabled Combat Illegal Logging Act of 2007,
by expanding its protection to a broader range of plants and plant products. This
makes it a legal prohibition to import illegal timber products into the US and places
‘due diligence’ requirements on the industry (Duncan Brack and Rob Bailey (2013)).
Penalties for violation of the Act are severe and can range from 1-5 years in prison
and up to $500,000 in fine. With the adoption of the European Union Timber Reg-
ulation (EUTR) and Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition Bill in 2013, many other
countries are adopting a similar approach to the US (Brack (2012)).
The Lacey Act has several appealing features making it a relevant case study.
First, unlike EUTR, the Lacey Act is enforced by a small but expert federal team,
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thus improving enforcement. Second, US is the single largest importer of wood and
wood based products, driving the global demand for timber. In 2006 alone, the US
imported $3.8 billion worth of wood products (not including pulp and paper), of
which 10% were considered to be ‘high risk’ 1. Finally, the Lacey Act was imple-
mented in 2008, giving me enough years after its introduction to measure the impact
of the policy.
My measure of illegality is motivated from the literature on illicit trade. I take
advantage of the difference in legality of shipments between importer and exporter
countries to proxy for illegal trade. Once the illegally exported goods leave the
country of origin, they are not generally regarded as contraband when imported
into the destination, absent additional agreements (Gerstenblith (2004)). Thus, US
imports provide a proxy for ‘true’ level of trade and the difference between importer
and exporter trade figures provide a credible measure of illegal exports. Following
Fisman and Wei (2009) I construct the measure of illegal trade as the reporting gap
defined by the log difference between imports and mirror exports. In absence of
illegal behaviour, the illegal trade/ reporting gap should simply be the difference
in trade costs between US and the exporter country2 and not vary systematically
before and after the Lacey Act by exporter country attributes.
To isolate the casual effect of the policy on illegal trade in timber, I need exoge-
nous variation in the implementation of the policy. This is unlikely to hold given
that the Act was strongly lobbied by various politicians and organizations. Some
have argued that the amendment was introduced to protect US lumber jobs from
foreign competition (Christianson (2012)). However, the standalone implementation
of the Lacey Act by the US in 2008 induces differences in exposure across importer
countries and products, thus motivating a difference-in-difference estimator of the
treatment effect. The key difficulty for this exercise is to find an adequate control
group for which a difference-in-difference methodology can be applied. This is
not straightforward as other importer countries and/or products may be differing
in many ways, such that it is difficult to verify a common trends assumption. In
particular, the identification assumption here requires that no omitted time-varying
characteristics are correlated with the timing of the policy. Thus, in addition to in-
cluding a hoard of fixed effects, I present the exercise using two different control
groups to try and address shortcomings associated with each strategy individually.
First, I use the European Union 27 (EU)3 as a valid control for timber trade given that
it is the other main wood importer in the world with similar level of institutions as
the US. To address concerns regarding the differential impact of the financial crisis
on importer countries and potential spill over of the policy via processing countries,
I use US imports of works of art (HS Code 97) as an alternative control. The choice
of works of art as a control is motivated from Fisman and Wei (2009) who show
1See http://eia-global.org/lacey/ accessed 14/03/14)
2The exporter country reports FOB values, while the importer country reports CIF values. The
difference between the two measures is essentially freight costs and related charges.
3I aggregate data across the 27 member states of the European Union.
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there is a strong link between corruption and illegal trade in objects of antiquities.
Works of art provide for a good control/ placebo since the Lacey Act is irrelevant
for consideration of trade in antiquities, yet it is a known commodity fraught by
illegalities4.
In sum, I find that the Lacey Act reduced timber imports between 20% and 50%
post 2008 depending on the experiment design. This highlights a significant and
real effect of the policy on US trade. Next, I find suggestive evidence for a fall in
the reporting gap for timber imports using both the counterfactual exercises. An
examination of the non-parametric esitmates confirms large and persistent effects
only post 2008. Further, using the differential level of corruption across exporter
countries, I test the effectiveness of the policy in reducing the reporting gap for ‘high
risk’ countries. I conclude that the effect of the policy increases with the degree of
corruption in the exporter country and that this is driven by better reporting in
the exporter country; for an increase in corruption by 1 standard deviation, the
bilateral reporting gap between the US and the exporter country falls by 60% post
the introduction of the Lacey Act. This suggests consumer country enforcement
seems to “bite” where it matters the most.
A potential concern regarding the measure of illegal trade is that data maybe
missing from the official statistics for various reasons other than illegal activity.
Data maybe missing due to exchange-rate miscalculations, different accounting pro-
cedures, or statistical errors. However, one would not expect these to be correlated
with the introduction of the Lacey Act. To ensure my measure of illegal trade is ro-
bust to such concerns, I re-construct the reporting gap in various ways. In particular,
since the reporting gap should be positive for there to be a meaningful interpreta-
tion of the measure5, I re-define the measure by censoring the negative values to
zero, I truncate the data by dropping negative values and I also censor the positive
values to zero as a placebo check. Finally I also consider the quantity gap6 in order
to address concerns related to trade costs, CIF and FOB reporting. I find my results
remain robust across the different specifications.
The second part of the chapter tries to provide evidence on the link between
the Lacey Act and deforestation. One major challenge linking any trade activity/
policy and deforestation is that, only a fraction of trees cut enter the export market
(Burgess (1993)). One country where forestry has been a significant component of
export led growth is Indonesia.
Using regional variation in level of corruption (Transparency International, 2008)
and Global Forest Change (GFC) satellite imagery for deforestation data, I present
a reduced form relationship between the Lacey Act and deforestation in Indonesia.
The GFC allows me to detect deforestation at a 30 meter by 30 meter resolution
annually for all of Indonesia from 2001 to 2012 (Hansen et al. (2013)). Motivated
4Within HS97, the sub-heading HS 9703 is also subject to the Lacey Act requirements as it may
contain significant parts of wood. Excluding it from the analysis does not change my results.
5Negative gap may exist due to reporting error or due to timing of recording in the even trade
happens at the end of the year.
6Quantity gap is measured by the difference in the reported value of weight measured in kilograms.
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from the earlier findings, I use the measure of corruption to identify the degree of
within country exposure to the Lacey Act. I find that an increase in corruption by 1
standard deviation reduces deforestation by 16,500 hectares post 20087. The findings
in this chapter are consistent with recent firm level evidence where Rodrigue and
Soumonni (2014) show that Indonesian firms that invest in environmental abatement
are likely to observe 1.4% to 6% faster growth in export demand. Put together,
trade policies can alter demand for more environmentally conscious goods and thus
change the nature of production and products on a global level.
This chapter adds to the growing empirical literature on trade of restricted goods
(see for example Fisman and Wei, 2009; Vezina, 2014; Chimeli et al., 2012; Ivanova,
2007) and economics of deforestation (see for example Burgess et al., 2012; Morjaria,
2014), however there are two key departures from prior work. First, earlier studies
of trade in restricted goods have focused largely on correlates of illegal trade, while
I use rich source of cross country data to provide a better understanding of policies
aimed at combating illegal trade, thus adding to the literature on illegal behaviour.
Second, I present evidence of a trade policy on reducing deforestation in Indonesia,
a country where forestry exports are a key component of the economy. Finally, the
chapter also falls under the broad research question of international trade and non-
tariff barriers (see for example Brown, 2013, 2006; Staiger, 2012; Michaels and Zhi,
2010)
It is important to note that the chapter only carries out a partial equilibrium
exercise. I try to extend the analysis by looking at deforestation and illegal trade
in timber, however, there maybe other welfare worsening effects of the policy for
parties involved, at least in the short run. In presence of weak institutions, many
developing countries may have no better alternative other than to engage in unsus-
tainable/ illegal logging. Doing a general equilibrium analysis is beyond the scope
of this chapter, thus the reader is cautioned to keep an open mind when interpreting
the results.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2 I present a simple
framework to motivate the analysis to follow. Section 3 provides a brief background
on the institutional features of the Lacey Act and the data used in the chapter.
Section 4 presents the core results establishing the link between consumer country
policies and illegal trade in timber. Section 5 extends the analysis of the Lacey Act
linking it to deforestation and section 6 concludes.
1.1 Framework
In order to guide the empirical analysis to follow, I present a stylized framework
with a single importer and single exporter with a market for exports of illegal tim-
ber. Price of illegal (i) timber is denoted by pi and is determined in equilibrium.
Importers can only be caught at customs, after which all timber becomes legal if
7I am not able to use the Lacey Act as an instrument for illegal trade as I do not have a measure of
regional level exports from Indonesia.
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undetected. Importers are faced with a probability of detection which is assumed
to be a function of the level of illegal timber imported (q(i)). Thus, the greater the
amount of illegal imports, the higher the likelihood of being detected at customs.
The importer receives a revenue of i if not discovered, and i − f q(i) if discovered.
The price of the timber sold on the retail market is normalized to one. For simplicity,
the importer keeps all illegal timber in the event of detection, but must pay a fixed
fine f with probability q(i) in the event he/ she is caught. It is important to note
that the legal and illegal timber markets could have significant interdependencies
in reality, which would complicate the analysis. For example, legal imports maybe
used to mask illegal imports, thus the detection technology of customs maybe a
function of the share of illegal imports as opposed to the level of illegal imports. I
abstain from these interactions in order to highlight the role of corruption on illegal
trade. The importer thus solves the following expected profit function:
maxi (1− pi)i− f q(i), s.t i ≥ 0. (1.1)
Conversely, the supply of illegal timber comes from the exporter. The exporter
has a similar problem to the importer, however his probability of detection not only
depends on the amount of his own illegal exports, but also on the corruption level
of his country. The probability with which he is detected is a function of φr(i),
where φ is the level of corruption in the exporter country and r(i) is the probability
of detection dependent on the level of illegal exports. The cost of extracting timber
is assumed to be linear in the amount of illegal timber extracted. The cost per
unit extracted is denoted by c. In the event the exporter is detected, he is allowed to
export the timber but must pay a fixed fine g. The exporter maximizes the following
expected profit function:
maxi (pi − c)i− gφr(i), s.t i ≥ 0. (1.2)
I assume both detection technologies, q(.) and r(.) are convex in illegal wood
exports. Thus ∂q∂i ≥ 0 and ∂
2q
∂i2 ≥ 0. Same holds for r(.).
The first order condition for the importer is:
1− pi − f qi(i) = 0 (1.3)
The first order conditions for the exporter is:
pi − c− gφri = 0 (1.4)
Conditions 1.3 and 1.4 simply state that the marginal revenue of a unit of wood
must equal its marginal cost8. Solving 1.3 for ps and substituting the resulting
expression in 1.4, we get:
8All second order conditions ensure these are local maximums
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1− f qi(i)− c− gφri = 0 (1.5)
The above condition ensures that the risk return payoff is equalized between
the importer and exporter through the market price of illegal wood pi. I treat the
introduction of the Lacey Act as an increase in the fine required to be paid by the
importer in the event he/she is detected smuggling illegal wood. This is motivated
by the fact that the fine for importing illegal wood increased up to $500,000. Our
primary interest is to study the impact of the Lacey Act on the equilibrium level of
illegal wood traded and if there are heterogeneous effects of the policy based on the
exporter country corruption. Below I present the comparative statics. First, consider
how demand for illegal wood responds to changes in the level of fine applied by the
importer country:
∂i
∂ f
=
−qi
f + qii + gφrii
< 0 (1.6)
Prediction 1: The model predicts that the introduction of Lacey Act as measured
by the rise in importer country fine should reduce trade in illegal wood.
Next, let us consider the second partial with respect to corruption φ in the ex-
porter country:
∂2i
∂ f ∂φ
= −
qii ∂i∂φ + grii
∂i
∂ f
gφrii + f q+ ii
> 0 (1.7)
The result is based on the assumption that detection technologies are strictly
convex and ∂i∂φ =
gri
f qii+gφrii
< 0. Thus the model predicts that countries with higher
degree of corruption (inverse of φ) will experience a bigger impact of the Lacey
Act then countries with lower level of corruption (i.e. a high φ). The intuition
for the above finding is subtle. Demand shocks effect the equilibrium quantity of
illegal timber traded via two channels, one being the direct impact on the price
of illegal timber and the other being through the risk return trade-off from being
caught. Imagine that there is an exogenous positive demand shock to the price of
illegal timber. In this case, exporters will increase quantity of illegal timber traded,
however this also effects their detection technology through φcr(i). Since the effect
of a rise in exports of illegal timber increases the detection of less corrupt countries
by a bigger amount (due to a higher φc), they will respond less to a positive demand
shock, similarly, they will also respond less to a negative demand shock. Thus, the
Lacey Act, which is as a negative demand shock, will have a larger effect for more
corrupt countries.
Prediction 2: The greater is the degree of corruption in the exporter country, the
more responsive it will be to the introduction of the Lacey Act. In other words,
the Lacey Act is able to target precisely the countries where timber is likely to be
of more susceptible nature.
18
1.2 Background and Data
1.2.1 Background: Lacey Act
Illegal trade may arise if it is more costly to comply within the law of the country.
It may arise even when legal trade may not be more costly, but if demand exceeds
supply of legal products. This is often the case for timber as producing countries
try to manage their natural forests from over exploitation.9 It involves any one of
the following activities: the harvest, transportation, purchase or sale of timber in
violation of laws. The harvesting procedure itself may be illegal, including using
corrupt means to gain access to forests; extraction without permission or from a
protected area; the cutting of protected species; or the extraction of timber in excess
of agreed limits.
The amendment to the Lacey Act extended the ban on trading illegally sourced
wood products in 2008. There are two major components to the amendment: a ban
on trading plants or plant products harvested in violation of the law; and a require-
ment to declare the scientific name, value, quantity, and country of harvest origin
for some products. The ammendment to the Lacey Act was first floated by Con-
gressman Earl Blumenauer in March of 2007 under the “Legal Timber Protection
Act”. Senator Wyden introduced a senate version in August of 2007 after garner-
ing support from environmental and industry groups under the “Combat Illegal
Logging Act of 2007”. At the Time of introduction, the act had 3 cosponsors and
backing of 24 organizations. Finally the ammendment was adopted in May 2008
under the Lacey Act. A brief timeline of the evolution of the Lacey Act is presented
in appendix 1.B figure 1.B.1
The Lacey Act has a very broad coverage making it extremely difficult for im-
porters to claim negligence as a defence. The Act requires the importer to prove
legality of harvest, legality of transactions (i.e. taxes, fees and etc.) and plant protec-
tion laws (i.e. CITES, local laws); further, the underlying foreign law violation does
not have to be a criminal violation, nor one actively enforced in the foreign country.
It need not be committed by the person charged with violating the Lacey Act - a
third party might have taken the product illegally; the underlying foreign law can
be interpreted by the US courts. More importantly, enforcement is fact based and
not document based (which themselves can be subject to corruption).
Penalties for violation of the Act are also steep, acting as a deterrent in conduct of
illegal trade. There is complete forfeiture of goods, misdemeanours are punishable
by 1 year in prison and a fine of $100,000 ($200,000 for corporations), while felonies
are punishable by 5 years in prison and a $250,000 fine ($500,000 for corporations).
Finally the agencies interested in the enforcement of the Act include, but are
not limited to: (1) U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; (2) Animal Plant Health Inspection
Service; (3) Immigration and Customs Enforcement; (4) Customs and Border Protec-
9On the other hand, illegal trade may exist for completely banned products, which is generally
common in wildlife crime.
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tion; (5) U.S. Department of Agriculture; (6) Federal Bureau of Investigation; and (7)
U.S. Forest Service. In investigating potential violations of the Act, these agencies
may receive information from a wide variety of sources, including industry partici-
pants, foreign governments and border agents. It is important to note that the Lacey
Act provides a “whistle-blower" reward for any person who provides information
leading to an arrest or civil penalty under the Act.
Since 2008, the Act has been used in multiple enforcement cases, with the most
famous being against Gibson Guitars in 2009 and a current ongoing investigation
against US Lumber Liquidators, the largest importers of wooden flooring. Gibson
Guitars was found guilty of buying endangered wood from Madagascar and banned
wood from India, while US Lumber Liquidators are facing questions concerning
illegality within their supply chain for wood harvested from Russian endangered
tiger habitat.
1.2.2 Data
1.2.3 Trade Data
The import and export data come from the United Nations’ Comtrade database.
These data are collected by the United Nations Statistical Division from the trade
records of individual countries, and include information on imports and exports for
each country, recorded according to the six-digit Harmonized Commodity Descrip-
tion and Coding System (HS). I use data for the years 2003 onward for two reasons;
first the quality of reporting has significantly improved in developing countries post
2002 and second, the governance indicators constructed by the World Bank are con-
sistently available post 2001. This results in an unbalanced panel for 2003 to 2012.
Trade in timber of all form (processed or unprocessed) excluding furniture is
classified as having HS code 44. Figure 1.B.2 in appendix 1.B shows the schedule
of commodities and respective product codes for which the Lacey Act was imple-
mented post 200810.
Motivated from Fisman and Wei (2009), the primary outcome variable is given
by:
TimberGapcyi = log(1+USImportscyi)− log(1+ ExportstoUSAcyi) (1.8)
Where c indexes exporter country, y indexes year, i indexes 4 digit product code,
USImportscyi is the imports reported by the United States from exporter c, and
ExportstoUSAcyi is the exports reported by exporter c destined for the United States.
Replacing missing values with 0, or in my case with a value 1 has often been argued
to be arbitrary. However in the case of illegal trade, missing values may occur due
to miss-reporting and thus must be treated as 0. For example, in 2009, the Lacey
105 out of 21 4 digit categories are not included in the Lacey Act. I decide to keep them in the
analysis due to potential spill over effects to other timber products. The results are qualitatively
similar to excluding them from the analysis
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Act was enforced against Gibson Guitar who illegally imported Indian sawn timber,
which was miss-reported in India. As per India’s export regulation, unfinished
wood is classified as sawn timber with thickness greater than 6mm and is banned
from being exported. The tariff code for such wood is HS 4407. Finished sawn
timber, is classified as wood thinner than 6mm and has a tariff code of HS 4408.
In the case of Gibson guitars, the Indian export documents labelled the wood as
HS 9209, which refer to arts and accessories of musical instruments 11. This clear
miss-reporting would make it appear as if India never exported any wood to the
US, while the US would show a positive value for the wood, which was classified as
HS 4407 upon entering the US customs. Thus, missing values are a key component
to understand illegal trade and must be treated as 0 or 1 as I define above. In the
event miss-reporting is purely random, then the Lacey Act should not have any
effect on the trade. It is important to note that my measure of illegal trade is a lower
bound as all illegal activity channelled through processing countries (i.e. China in
the case of US Lumber Liquidators) will be absent from the data. All other illegal
trade measures are constructed in the same manner as above.
1.2.4 Other Data
The measure of corruption is obtained from the World Bank World Governance
Indicators database (Kaufmann et al. (2014)). The indicators combine the views of
a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial
and developing countries. The index ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values
corresponding to better outcomes. To avoid confusion, I use the negative of the
values reported, thus a higher value is associated with a worst outcome.
I control for the overall level of economic development by including the gross do-
mestic product (GDP) per capita in 2000 US dollars (Ln(GDPPCUScy)), taken from
the World Development Indicators database. I add regional fixed effects, defining
regions as North America and the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia,
Oceania, and the Middle East.
Finally I do a small amount of data cleaning. I exclude all exporter by 4 digit
HS product pairs which had a negative trade gap for all ten years of the sample.
Since the negative of the reporting gap is not very meaningful, I exclude such pairs
where there is a bias in reporting through out the sample. The final sample used in
the policy analysis is an unbalanced panel of exporter-year-product observations. I
present summary statistics in table 1.1.
In appendix 1.B, figure 1.B.3, I present the mean relationship between Corruptioncy
and US TimberGapcyi for the period covering the entire sample, 2003-2012. There is
a non-linear relationship with the gap increasing rapidly as the level of corruption
increases (the overall correlation coefficient ρ = 0.36). A large number of exporting
countries where we worry about corruption happen to be in Africa and Asia. Fig-
11http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/the-lacey-act-from-conservation-to-
criminalization, last accessed on 17/08/2014
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ure 1.B.4 present the same plot but for different regions. There is a clear positive
relationship (with a correlation coefficient ρ = 0.50 and 0.33 respectively). The corre-
lation between corruption and illegal trade is weaker for Latin America and Europe
(with a correlation coefficient ρ = 0.15 and 0.07 respectively.).
1.3 Lacey Act
1.3.1 Impact on Timber Trade
Before turning to the impact of the Lacey Act on illegal trade, I first present evidence
on the impact of the Lacy Act on US imports. Since the Act deters illegal imports
of timber products, we would expect there to be a negative shock to the imports
of timber. First, I use the EU as a valid control for US timber trade, given that
it has similar levels of institutions and is the other large consumer of timber. For
this section, I restrict my analysis to data as reported by the importer country. I
specifically consider the fixed effects regression:
Ln(Imports)dcyi = αc+γi+ δy+ β1 Iyear≥2008+ β2USd+ β3 Iyear≥2008 ∗USd+X′cyΣ+ edcyi
(1.9)
where Ln(Imports)dcyi is the natural logarithm of imports for importer (d) and
exporter (c) pair in year (y) for HS 4 digit product (i). αc, γi and δy are exporter
country, product and year fixed effects respectively, Iyear≥2008 is an indicator value
equal to one for years greater or equal to 2008, and Xcy is a vector of time varying
controls for exporter country (c) in year (y). Note that δy is perfectly collinear with
the indicator dummy Iyear≥2008, thus the estimating equation becomes:
Ln(Imports)dcyi = αc + γi + δy + β2USd + β3 Iyear≥2008 ∗USd + X′cyΣ+ edcyi (1.10)
The coefficient of interest is β3, which measures the average difference in the
imports over time between the US and EU. Under the assumption that, after con-
trolling for exporter, product, year fixed effects and exogenous covariates, changes
in the bilateral trade experienced by EU provide a reasonable counterfactual for US
bilateral trade.
Table 1.2 presents the results, comparing the impact of the Lacey Act on US rel-
ative to the EU. The baseline regression is presented in column 1, while in columns
(2)-(9) I successively introduce controls. The difference in difference estimator re-
mains significant and large even after controlling for various demanding fixed ef-
fects. The results indicate that US experienced a fall in imports after the introduction
of the Lacey Act when compared to the EU.
Second, based on existing literature, I use US trade in works of art (HS Code
97) as an alternative counterfactual. Fisman and Wei (2009) show a high incidence
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of illegality in exports of banned antiques, which forms a part of the aggregate
commodity works of art. Though works of art tend to have high levels of illegal
trade, we would not expect the Lacey Act to have any effect on its trade. I consider
the fixed effects regression:
Ln(Imports)cyi = αc+γi+ δy+ β1 Iyear≥2008+ β2Timberi+ β3 Iyear≥2008 ∗Timberi+X′cyΣ+ ecyi
(1.11)
where Ln(Imports)cyi is the natural logarithm of imports for exporter (c) in year
(y) for HS 4 digit product (i). αc, γi and δy are exporter country, product and year
fixed effects respectively, Iyear≥2008 is an indicator value equal to one for years greater
or equal to 2008, and Xcy is a vector of time varying controls for exporter country
(c) in year (y). Note that δy and γi are perfectly collinear with the indicator dummy
Iyear≥2008 and Timberi, thus the estimating equation becomes:
Ln(Imports)cyi = αc + γi + δy + β3 Iyear≥2008 ∗ Timberi + X′cyΣ+ ecyi (1.12)
The coefficient of interest is β3, which measures the average difference in the
imports over time between the timber and works of art. Table 1.3 presents the re-
sults, comparing the impact of the Lacey Act on Timber imports relative to imports
of works of art. The baseline regression is presented in column 1, while in columns
(2)-(6) I successively introduce controls. Once again, the difference in difference esti-
mator remains significant and large through out. The results across the two models
indicate that US timber imports fell between 20% and 50% after the introduction of
the Lacey Act, depending on the counterfactual exercise used. This implies signifi-
cant and real effects of the policy on US imports of timber.
Using my preferred specifications from table1.2 and 1.3 I estimate weighted re-
gressions using 2 digit trade shares for exporter country in 2003. The coefficients
remain robust, indicating that trade with small countries is not driving my findings.
Finally, I estimate the model non-parametrically to test for the parallel trends as-
sumption using both the value of imports and quantity of imports as my dependent
variable. We would expect no impact of the policy on years prior to 2008, while
we expect the effect of the treatment to be positive for years post 2008. Table 1.4
provides evidence in support of this observation. In column (1) to (4), I present
the exercise for EU as my control, while in columns (5) to (7), I replace the control
group with imports of works of art. In both the models, the omitted year dummy is
2003. The coefficients on the interaction of year dummies and treatment are negative
and significant for years post 2007 under both counterfactual exercises. For years
prior to 2007, the coefficients are smaller and no longer significant. The fall in the
coefficients begin in 2007, the year when the legislation was first proposed in the
US Senate12 (“Combatting Illegal Logging Act” lac (2007)). The timing of the effect
12I am unable to perform meaningful impact of the policy on the quantity of imports as there are a
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makes it difficult to dis-entangle the impact of the policy from the slowing down of
the housing starts in the US, never the less the effect remains persistent well after
the economic upturn, confirming the effect of the policy on imports of timber13
1.3.2 Lacey Act and Illegal Trade
In this section, I test the prediction of my simple model on the impact of the Lacey
Act on illegal trade. In order to test the hypothesis, that the Lacey Act has been
effective in reducing illegal trade in timber, I start with equation 1.10 and 1.12,
replacing the dependent variable with the constructed measure of illegal trade. The
results are presented in table 1.5 and table 1.6. The experiment of interest, the
interaction between the Lacey Act (Iyear≥2008) and the treatment dummy is significant
and large in magnitude regardless of the control group used. The results provide
suggestive evidence that timber trade experienced a fall in the reporting gap after
the introduction of the Lacey Act. The effect ranges between 75% and 90% based on
the counterfactual exercise applied. This implies, the Lacey Act is responsible for
eliminating almost all of the US timber trade gap.
Table 1.7 provides some robustness checks for the prefered specification across
both the control groups. Weighting the regression by 2 digit trade shares for ex-
porter country in 2003 reduces the size of the coefficient and increases the standard
errors, hinting that trade with smaller nations maybe driving the results 14. Next,
I test for whether the results are being driven by the fall in the positive gap or by
a fall in the negative gap, by censoring the negative values to zero and the positive
values to zero respectively. There are some puzzling aspects to the results. The
driving force behind the fall in reporting gap should be a decrease in the positive
side of the reporting gap for it to have a meaningful interpretation. This is indeed
true for both control groups, however, I also find the negative of the reporting gap
decreasing after the introduction of the Lacey Act. One potential reason for this can
be that the trade in the 4th quarter of a year is recorded at different points in time
by the importer and exporter country. For instance, exports may appear in the cur-
rent year, while imports may appear the following year due to transit times. This,
could potentially affect the negative gap to increase if exporter country reporting
improves post the Lacey Act. However, the significant relationship between the pos-
itive of the reporting gap and the Lacey Act provides suggestive evidence in favor
of there being a meaningful treatment effect. Finally, I present the non-parametric
estimates of the preferred specification. The omitted year dummy is 2007, the year
before the introduction of the Lacey Act. The fall in the reporting gap only starts
post 2008, consistent with the introduction of the policy.
Having established evidence of the policy on timber imports and the reporting
substantial number of observations in works of art with missing data.
13I present the same exercise for both the EU and works of art aggregated at the HS 2 digit product
code. The results are presented in appendix 1.A table 1.A.2 and 1.A.1. The findings are robust and
consistent with the dis-aggregated data.
14Indeed countries like Canada make up bulk of the share of US timber trade.
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gap, I test the second prediction of the model, is the effect of the policy bigger for
more corrupt countries? To explore the relationship between corruption and the
Lacey Act further, I take a look at the US timber trade data more closely in the next
section.
1.3.3 Lacey Act, Corruption and Illegal Trade
In this section I study the heterogeneous impact of the Lacey Act on illegal trade.
I estimate a difference-in-difference estimator motivated by the theoretical model
developed earlier (with degree of corruption in the exporter country as a proxy for
intensity of treatment). As per the theoretical prediction, exporter countries with
a higher degree of corruption should see the biggest impact of better consumer
country enforcement. Since corrupt countries are most likely to be exporting illegal
timber15, either due to illegal exploitation of forests and/or due to non-compliance
with domestic laws, we would expect the Lacey Act to be more binding for more
corrupt countries. The baseline specification is as follows:
TimberGapcyi = αc+γi+ δy+ β2Corruptioncy+ β3 Iyear≥2008 ∗Corruptioncy+X′cyΣ+ ecyi
(1.13)
Now the variable of interest is the interaction between Iyear≥2008 and Corruptioncy,
with β3 being the difference in difference estimator, with corruption beign a mea-
sure of continuous treatment. Table 1.8 presents the main results, I sequentially
introduce controls as we move across the columns. I find that the Lacey Act is able
to reduce illegal trade between 56% and 63% for an increase in corruption by 1
standard deviation post 2008.
In table 1.9, I present a hoard of robustness checks. Column (1) presents the
preferred specification from table 1.8. In column (2), I weight the regression by
2 digit exporter country trade shares in 2003. The coefficient on the interaction
term is marginally insignificant, but the estimate maintains it stability. In column
(3) I consider the quantity gap, the coefficient remains significant and very stable in
magnitude. In columns (4) to (7) I test for whether the results are being driven by the
fall in the positive gap or by a fall in the negative gap. Column (4) looks at absolute
values of the gap, while column (5) truncates the data by dropping all negative
gap values, and column (6) censors the negative values to zero. All three columns
yield similar and significant results. In column (7), I censor the positive values to
zero and as expected there is no effect of the Lacey Act on the negative gap. In
columns (8) and (9) I divide the sample into Africa and Asia and the rest of the
World respectively. Consistent with the visual inspection of the correlation between
corruption and illegal trade, all of the effect is being driven by Africa and Asia, while
15In appendix 1.A table 1.A.3, I replicate table 2 from Fisman and Wei (2009) for the correlation
between the reporting gap timber (HS Code 44)/ works of art (HS Code 97) and corruption. The
results highlight that the reporting gap and exporter country corruption are correlated when there are
exporter incentives for miss-reporting regardless of the product type.
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the sub sample consisting of the rest of the World has a smaller and insignificant
coefficient on the interaction term. In columns (10) I present a placebo test replacing
the dependent variable with the reporting gap for works of art. Since the Lacey Act
did not affect other product categories, the differences in trade statistics should be
pure noise with respect to the interaction between corruption and Iyear≥2008. Indeed,
the coefficient on the difference in difference estimator is smaller and statistically
insignificant.
Next, I estimate the model non-parametrically. I run the following regression:
TimberGapcyi = αci+γiy+ δry+ β2Corruptioncy+
2012
∑
l=2004
β1lDl ∗ Corruptioncy+X′cyΣ+ ecyi
(1.14)
Dl refers to the year dummies and the omitted dummy category is for l = 2003.
Thus, the coefficient β1l provides estimates for the impact of the Lacey Act for each
year compared to the omitted category or control year (i.e. l = 2003). Column (12)
provides evidence in support of the treatment taking effect post 2008. There is a
pre-treatment effect in 2006, however it is only marginally significant and that too
half in magnitude relative to the size of the impact post 2008.
In this section, I have provided evidence in support of a heterogeneous effect
of the Lacey Act, and in particular one consistent with targeting countries deemed
‘high risk’. Next, I try to understand some of the mechanisms behind the fall in the
reporting gap and their impact on the exporter country.
1.3.4 Importer vs Exporter Reporting
The fall in illegal trade observed maybe due to a decline in recorded imports or
an increase in recorded exports. Evidence from section 1.3.1, indeed shows that
imports fell post 2008. One concern regarding the Lacey Act is that in the short
run the fall in illegal trade may not be replaced by legal trade, thus negatively
effecting the exporter country. To see if the impact of the Lacey Act is being driven
by a fall in illegal imports or a shift from illegal to legal exports, I replicate the
difference in difference estimator for TimberImportscyi and TimberExportscyi, where
the two variables are natural log of imports as reported by the US and natural log of
exports as reported by the exporter country. Panel A and B of table 1.10 present the
results for TimberImportscyi and TimberExportscyi respectively. The Lacey Act has no
significant effect on imports, however there is a positive and significant impact of the
Lacey Act on the reporting of exports, implying that reporting has improved more
in more corrupt places post 2008. This provides evidence in support of a positive
impact of substitution from illegal to legal trade. For an increase in corruption by 1
standard deviation, the Lacey act increases exporter reported trade by 62%.
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1.3.5 Composition of USA Trading Partners
In addition to having an effect on illegal trade, the Lacey Act may have also changed
the composition of US trading partners. Using the data as reported by US customs, I
look at the impact of the Lacey Act on the share of country c exports to the USA. To
do this, I construct the variable importshcyi simply defined as the share of imports
from exporter c for product i in the total US imports for product i in year y. Since
the aim of the Lacey Act is to reduce the trade in illegally sourced timber, one may
expect there to be a shift away from imports of timber from more corrupt countries.
I use the same difference in difference specification thus far to identify the impact of
the Lacey Act on the composition of US imports. I do not find any evidence of the
Lacey Act on the composition of import shares. Regression results for the exercise
are presented in appendix 1.A table 1.A.4. In the next section, I turn to the analysis
of linking the Lacey Act to deforestation in the tropics.
1.4 Deforestation
Having established a relationship between the Lacey Act and illegal trade in timber,
I present an exercise on the impact of such policies on deforestation. Even though a
reduction in tax evasion, better allocation of timber rights and other illegal activities
may have declined post the Lacey Act, it does not necessarily imply deforestation
would have decreased. Though the former is very important for efficient functioning
of governments, one real effect we care about is the rate of deforestation in some
of the reaming tropics. In this section, I study the impact of the Lacey Act on
deforestation within Indonesia.
Indonesia in many ways is an ideal context for studying the impact of trade
policies on deforestation. First, it contains one of the three largest stands of tropical
forest in the world16 with annual deforestation of 1.17 million hectares of forested
area per year 17. Second, rapid deforestation places it just behind USA and China
as the third largest producer of greenhouse gases worldwide (Burgess et al. (2012)).
Third, the unique feature of the Suharto government and its emphasis on export-
led development meant that Indonesia is the largest exporter of tropical timber in
the world, with exports valued at more than $5 billion per year 18. Finally, a large
number of Indonesian timber exports are destined directly to the USA (Duery and
Vlosky (2006)) 19.
1.4.1 Deforestation Data
In order to study the impact of the USA trade policy on deforestation in Indone-
sia, I use regional level data on forest loss before and after the introduction of the
16The other two being the Amazon and the Congo basins.
17http://risk.forestlegality.org/countries/638/status, accessed on 1st July 2014
18http://risk.forestlegality.org/countries/638/status, accessed on 1st July 2014
19The average USA imports from Indonesia was $367 million per year between 2003 and 2012,
authors calculations.
27
Lacey Act in 2008. The deforestation measure is constructed using the Global Forest
Change 2001-2012 data published by University of Maryland which has been used
by geographers and economists to map deforestation (See Hansen et al. (2013)).
The dataset constitutes a set of satellite derived images of the world’s deforested
pixels from 2001 to 2012 with a spatial resolution of approximately 30x30 meters
per pixel at the equator. The data has the advantage of being available, where re-
liable country level forestry statistics do not exist. Other recent applications have
been in the sphere of political economy, linking political patronage to land rights
and deforestation (see Morjaria (2014)). However, to the best of my knowledge, the
deforestation data has not been exploited to study the direct link between trade
policies and deforestation. The final measure of deforestation is simply the number
of pixels deforested in a specified geographic area over a period time.
For my identification strategy, I construct a regional measure of corruption us-
ing the Indonesia Corruption Perception and Bribery Index (CPI) 2008. The survey
was carried out by Transparency International Indonesia between September and
November 2008 with a total sample of 3841 respondents in 50 cities in Indonesia. I
construct a measure of regional corruption using the average CPI score across the
sampled cities and normalize it for ease of interpretation. Higher values are asso-
ciated with worst quality of governance. I obtain additional controls from Badan
Pusat Statistik (statistics Indonesia), namely the number of forest concessions by
regions and the natural logarithm of regional real GDP in billions of Rupiahs. Us-
ing the variation in the measure of corruption across regions in Indonesia, I apply
a difference in difference strategy to compare the impact of the Lacey Act across
regions and over time. The summary statistics of the data used for the analysis is
presented in table 1.11. In my preferred sample with no missing data, I remain with
a balanced panel of 22 regions from 2004-2012, giving me 192 observations.
1.4.2 Empirical Results
The model predictions would suggest that the Lacey Act is most binding for more
corrupt regions, thus we would expect there to be a fall in deforestation, the higher
is the level of regional corruption. I estimate the following fixed effects regression:
De f orestry = αr + γy + β1Laceyy ∗ Corruptionr + X′ryΣ+ ery (1.15)
Where De f orestry is the number of pixels deforested in region r and in year y.
αr are region fixed effects, γt are year fixed effects, β1 is the coefficient of interest,
providing the difference in difference estimator and X is a vector of time varying
regional controls. I do not include the Lacey Act indicator and regional level of
corruption in the model as they are perfectly collinear with year and region fixed
effects respectively. The results are presented in table 1.12. The coefficient on the
interaction of the LaceyAct and Corruption is marginally insignificant at the 10%sig-
nificance level in my baseline specificaton. The coefficient on Ln(RealGDP) is neg-
ative and significant, implying that richer regions have lower deforestation. Once I
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add the number of forest concessions awarded over time to different regions (col-
umn (3)), the difference in difference estimator becomes significant20. An increase in
corruption by one standard deviation decreases deforestation by 184,000 pixels post
2008. This is approximately equal to an area of 16,500 hectares. However, adding the
forest concession data leads to a loss of 11 regions where forest concession informa-
tion is missing. A further look at the data reveals that these regions have on average
very little deforestation. The average number of pixels deforested in the regions
with no concession data is 60 per year, while it is 600 in regions with information
on concessions granted. Thus, it is likely that these regions are not densely forested
and hence irrelevant. This is indeed true when you consider that the missing data is
for regions like Bali, Yogyakarta and Jawa to name a few. As expected, the greater
the number of concessions granted, the higher is the amount of deforestation. One
concern with adding the number of concessions granted as a control is that it might
be driving my results, especially since concessions themselves are endogenous to
policy changes. In column (4) I restrict my sample to regions where concession
data is not missing and exclude the number of concessions granted from the spec-
ification. The coefficient on the interaction term remains stable and significant. I
take this as suggestive evidence in favour of better compliance from the forestry
sector as opposed to better enforcement by the government. Since my left hand side
variable is a count measure with a high variance, in columns (5) and (6) I present
semi-logarithmic and Poisson models respectively. Both models yield qualitatively
similar results, however I lose some precision. Finally in column (7) I use my pre-
ferred specification from column (3) to estimate the model non-parametrically. I
estimate the following regression:
De f orestry = αr + γy +
2012
∑
l=2005
β1lDl ∗ Corruptionr + X′ryΣ+ ert (1.16)
where Dl refers to the year dummy. The omitted dummy category is for l =
2004. Thus, the coefficient β1l provides estimates for the impact of the Lacey Act for
each year compared to the omitted category or control year (i.e. l = 2004). Again,
we would expect no impact of the Act on years prior to 2008. Similarly we expect
the effect to be negative for years post 2008. I find that the effect of the policy is
significant only for years post 2008 and it gets bigger in size over time, but is also
less precise. Overall, the evidence suggests that the Lacey Act may have played a
role in slowing deforestation in Indonesia.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter set out to analyze the impact of the US consumer country policy on
tackling illegal trade in timber. This is the first study to evaluate the impact of
20Since I have a small number of clusters, I also apply the Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) cor-
rection for statistical inference with fewer than 30 clusters. My results remain robust to this correction
with the interaction term remaining statistically significant at the 10% level.
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trade policies on illegal trade, adding to the growing literature on measuring illicit
activities. Due to the nature of the topic, data in the field is often difficult to obtain,
thus making such studies difficult if not impossible. I highlight that trade statistics,
which have been used in the past to evaluate illegal activity can be meaningfully
used to study the impact of trade policies on illegal activity. I use this measure
to show that the US Lacey Act had a real impact on US imports of timber relative
to other countries (namely EU) and to imports of another commodity, which has
a significant component of illegality (works of art). This was accompanied by a
fall in the illegal activity as proxied by the reporting gap. Further, I show that the
policy had the largest impact on countries with the weakest institutions. Finally,
using Indonesia as a case study, I present suggestive evidence to support a fall in
deforestation post the introduction of the Lacey Act.
Though, it is commonly believed that the longrun benefits of eliminating illegal
timber from the supply chain out weight the costs, the short-term implications need
not. Given the partial equilibrium nature of the exercise, it is difficult to comment
on the welfare implications of the policy both for the importer and exporter country.
Since I show a significant fall in imports, even if it is entirely a fall in illegal trade, at
the extreme scenario, this maybe welfare worsening if the exporter country has no
alternative means of income. One of the success stories of the manufacturing sector
in Asia has been the timber industry in Indonesia, however it was also rampant with
corruption and illegality during its growth period. Thus one needs to fully weight
the cost and benefits of the policy against its long-term objectives. Keeping that in
mind, the results in this chapter provide important insights for policy makers on
the role of consumer countries in combating the global trade in endangered species,
illegal goods and other items of sensitive nature. Often, exporter countries have
week institutions, creating a difficult environment for enforcement. In this light,
the chapter emphasizes a stronger role for consumer countries in fighting trade in
illegal goods.
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Table 1.1: Illegal Trade Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Panel A - Full Sample
Corruption -0.26 1.07 -2.550 1.9 17,426
Trade Gap 1.76 6.68 -17.124 19.4 17,426
Ln(GDPPCUS) 8.64 1.51 4.890 11.4 17,009
Imports in millions of USD 13.51 151.0 0.002 7301 14,365
Exports in millions of USD 11.27 152.5 0.000 7303 12,804
Ln(1+Imports) 8.27 5.73 0.000 22.7 17,426
Ln(1+Exports) 10.02 5.26 0.000 22.7 17,426
Panel B - Timber (HS code 44)
Corruption -0.31 1.07 -2.550 1.8 11,821
Trade Gap 0.38 6.35 -16.890 19.4 11,821
Ln(GDPPCUS) 8.72 1.47 4.890 11.4 11,588
Imports in millions of USD 15.77 180.9 0.002 7301 9,241
Exports in millions of USD 13.31 175.1 0.000 7303 9,638
Ln(1+Imports) 9.20 5.32 0.000 22.7 11,821
Ln(1+Exports) 9.58 5.62 0.000 22.7 11,821
Panel C - Works of Art (HS code 97)
Corruption -0.16 1.05 -2.550 1.9 5,605
Trade Gap 4.66 6.44 -17.124 17.6 5,605
Ln(GDPPCUS) 8.46 1.59 4.890 11.4 5,421
Imports in millions of USD 9.43 71.4 0.002 2146 5,124
Exports in millions of USD 5.08 26 0.000 460 3,166
Ln(1+Imports) 6.31 6.06 0.000 19.9 5,605
Ln(1+Exports) 10.97 4.26 0.000 21.5 5,605
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the empir-
ical analysis. Trade data is measured in nominal US$. Imports and exports are in
millions of nominal US$. Import are reported as CIF values and exports are reported
as FOB values. The unit of observation is a importer by exporter by product by year
quadruple measured in nominal USD Corruption is a normalized index with higher
values indicating worst quality of governance. GDP per capita (GDPPCUS) is mea-
sured in constant 2005 US$. Panel A contains data for the full sample. Panel B and
C present summary statistics for Timber (HS Code 44) and Works of Arts (HS Code
97) respectively.
Source: UNCOMTRADE, WB World Development Indicators and WB World Gov-
ernance Indicators.
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Table 1.2: The Lacey Act and US Imports of Timber vs EU Imports of Timber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
US X Iyear≥2008 -0.200*** -0.198*** -0.195*** -0.201*** -0.273*** -0.314*** -0.257*** -0.272***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.074) (0.068) (0.068) (0.072)
Ln(GDPPCUS) 0.361 0.348 0.356 0.352 0.291 0.389
(0.256) (0.252) (0.252) (0.272) (0.263) (0.295)
Corruption -0.179 -0.164 -0.218* -0.187 -0.194
(0.117) (0.116) (0.127) (0.123) (0.129)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes . . . . .
Region Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes . .
Importer X Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes . . .
Importer X Product FE No No No Yes Yes . . .
ExporterX Product Fe No No No No Yes . . .
Importer X Exporter X Product FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Product X Year FE No No No No No No Yes Yes
Exporter X Year FE No No No No No No No Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7
Observations 19043 19043 19043 19043 19043 19043 19043 19043
Note: This table reports the effect of the Lacey Act on US imports relative to the EU. The panel is made of importer region
(US and EU) by 158 exporter countries and 21 HS 4 digit product codes for timber, over the period 2003-2012. The dependent
variable is the ln(imports) as reported by the importer region. US is an indicator equal to 1 if importer is the US and 0 if
importer is the EU. For description of variables, please refer to table 1.1. Regions are defined as North America and the
Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by exporter country.
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Table 1.3: The Lacey Act and US Imports of Timber vs Works of Art
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timber X Iyear≥2008 -0.514*** -0.509*** -0.507*** -0.507*** -0.572*** -0.605***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.063) (0.069)
Ln(GDPPCUS) 0.194 0.186 -0.032
(0.268) (0.270) (0.303)
Corruption -0.061 -0.144
(0.111) (0.107)
Year FE Yes . . . . .
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes . .
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes . .
Region X Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes .
Exporter X Product Fe No No No No Yes Yes
Exporter X Year FE No No No No No Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2
Observations 14025 14025 14025 14025 14025 14025
Note: This table reports the effect of the Lacey Act on US imports of Timber relative to the US
imports of works of art. The panel is made of 183 exporter countries and 21 and 7 HS 4 digit
product codes for timber and works of art respectively, over the period 2003-2012. The dependent
variable is the ln(imports) as reported by the importer region. Timber is an indicator equal to 1
if HS Code is 44 and 0 if HS Code is 97. For description of variables, please refer to table 1.1.
Regions are defined as North America and the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia,
Oceania, and the Middle East. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by exporter
country.
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Table 1.4: The Timing of the Lacey Act and US Timber Imports
Control: EU27 Control: Works of Art - HS code 97
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Weighted Ln(Imports in USD) Ln(Imports in kg) Baseline Weighted Ln(Imports in USD)
Treatment X Iyear≥2008 -0.195*** -0.534*** -0.507*** -0.728***
(0.066) (0.062) -0.065 -0.186
Ln(GDPPCUS) 0.348 1.289*** 0.345 0.176 0.186 0.807*** 0.178
(0.252) (0.316) (0.25) (0.35) (0.27) (0.242) (0.271)
Corruption -0.179 0.105 -0.178 -0.087 -0.061 0.114 -0.061
(0.117) (0.224) (0.114) (0.141) (0.111) (0.186) (0.11)
Treatment X 2004 -0.033 -0.072 -0.063
(0.079) (0.115) (0.095)
Treatment X 2005 -0.113 -0.181 0.006
(0.103) (0.131) (0.107)
Treatment X 2006 -0.037 0.112 -0.102
(0.104) (0.141) (0.12)
Treatment X 2007 -0.408*** -0.477*** -0.479***
(0.101) (0.158) (0.115)
Treatment X 2008 -0.344*** -0.328** -0.420***
(0.111) (0.15) (0.127)
Treatment X 2009 -0.408*** -0.552*** -0.734***
(0.115) (0.149) (0.126)
Treatment X 2010 -0.333*** -0.402*** -0.615***
(0.12) (0.145) (0.126)
Treatment X 2011 -0.386*** -0.467*** -0.690***
(0.126) (0.157) (0.13)
Treatment X 2012 -0.1 0.143 -0.729***
(0.129) (0.178) (0.129)
Mean of Dependent Variable 11.7 14.8 11.7 10.9 12.2 14.8 12.2
Observations 19043 18747 19043 18180 14025 13920 14025
Note: This table reports the timing of the Lacey Act on US imports of Timber relative to the the EU imports of timber and US imports of works
of art. The panel includes 158 and 183 exporter countries respectively and uses data from 2003-2012. The dependent variable is the ln(imports)
as reported by the importer region. Treatment is a US dummy for columns (1)-(4) and Timber dummy for columns (5)-(7). The control group
is imports of timber in the EU for columns (1)-(4) and US imports of works of art for columns (5)-(7). Columns (1)-(4) include Region by Year,
Importer by Exporter and Product fixed effects. Columns (5)-(7) include Region by Year, Exporter and Product fixed effects. For description
of variables, please refer to table 1.1. Regions are defined as North America and the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania,
and the Middle East. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by exporter country.
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Table 1.5: The Effect of the Lacey Act on Timber Reporting Gap vs EU Timber Reporting Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
USA x Iyear≥2008 -0.766*** -0.768*** -0.752*** -0.770*** -0.688*** -0.648*** -0.496** -0.236
(0.200) (0.198) (0.196) (0.196) (0.198) (0.198) (0.227) (0.159)
Ln(GDPPCUS) -0.465 -0.540 -0.530 -0.502 -0.652 -0.750
(1.867) (1.829) (1.809) (1.850) (1.767) (1.459)
Corruption -0.978 -0.950 -1.015 -0.964 -0.818
(0.945) (0.937) (0.956) (0.894) (0.900)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes . . . . .
Region X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes . .
Importer X Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes . . .
Importer X Product FE No No No Yes Yes . . .
Exporter X Product Fe No No No No Yes . . .
Importer X Exporter X Product FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Product X Year FE No No No No No No Yes Yes
Exporter X Year FE No No No No No No No Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.01
Observations 22299 22299 22299 22299 22299 22299 22299 22299
Note: This table reports the effect of the Lacey Act on US reporting gap relative to the EU reporting gap. The panel is
made of importer region (US and EU) by 158 exporter countries and 21 HS 4 digit product codes for timber, over the period
2003-2012. The dependent variable is the difference in the reporting gap measured as ln(importsdcyi) - ln(exportsdcyi). US
is an indicator equal to 1 if importer is the US and 0 if importer is the EU. For description of variables, please refer to
table 1.1. Regions are defined as North America and the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, and
the Middle East. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by exporter country.
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Table 1.6: The Effect of the Lacey Act on Timber Reporting Gap vs Reporting Gap in Works of
Art
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Timber X Iyear≥2008 -0.869*** -0.869*** -0.874*** -0.874*** -0.625*** -0.570**
(0.250) (0.250) (0.252) (0.252) (0.232) (0.237)
Ln(GDPPCUS) -0.632 -0.648 -0.885
(1.459) (1.474) (1.389)
Corruption -0.112 -0.264
(0.595) (0.519)
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes . .
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes . .
Region X Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes .
Exporter X Product Fe No No No No Yes Yes
Exporter X Year FE No No No No No Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73 1.73
Observations 17009 17009 17009 17009 17009 17009
Note: This table reports the impact of the Lacey Act on the US timber reporting gap relative
to the US reporting gap in works of art. The panel is made of 183 exporter countries and 21
and 7 HS 4 digit product codes for timber and works of art respectively, over the period 2003-
2012. The dependent variable is the difference in the reporting gap measured as ln(importsdcyi)
- ln(exportsdcyi). Timber is an indicator equal to 1 if HS Code is 44 and 0 if HS Code is 97. For
description of variables, please refer to table 1.1. Regions are defined as North America and the
Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East. Robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by exporter country.
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Table 1.7: The Effect of the Lacey Act on Timber Reporting Gap - Robustness
Control: EU27 Control: Works of Art - HS code 97
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Baseline Weighted PosCensor NegCensor Timing Baseline Weighted PosCensor NegCensor Timing
Treatment X Iyear≥2008 -0.752*** -0.251 -0.281* -0.471*** -0.874*** -0.473 -0.496*** -0.377***
(0.196) (0.263) (0.148) (0.098) (0.252) (0.313) (0.176) (0.108)
Ln(GDPPCUS) -0.540 5.704 -0.187 -0.353 -0.536 -0.648 1.785 -0.555 -0.093 -0.664
(1.829) (3.852) (1.527) (0.431) (1.816) (1.474) (3.347) (1.171) (0.445) (1.468)
Corruption -0.978 0.883 -0.721 -0.257 -0.978 -0.112 1.320 -0.163 0.051 -0.108
(0.945) (1.320) (0.780) (0.224) (0.938) (0.595) (0.933) (0.456) (0.198) (0.592)
Treatment X 2003 0.128 0.944**
(0.342) (0.413)
Treatment X 2004 0.203 0.107
(0.324) (0.373)
Treatment X 2005 0.469 0.162
(0.336) (0.363)
Treatment X 2006 -0.137 -0.315
(0.255) (0.315)
Treatment X 2008 -0.374 -0.228
(0.276) (0.357)
Treatment X 2009 -0.472* -0.799**
(0.282) (0.347)
Treatment X 2010 -0.654** -0.904**
(0.285) (0.397)
Treatment X 2011 -0.998*** -0.758**
(0.322) (0.376)
Treatment X 2012 -0.649** -0.860**
(0.281) (0.400)
Mean of Dependent Variable 2.01 1.15 3.43 -1.42 2.01 1.73 0.818 3.4 -1.67 1.73
Observations 22299 21928 22299 22299 22299 17009 16852 17009 17009 17009
Note: This table reports robustness checks for the effect of the Lacey Act on US timber imports relative to the EU-27 timber imports and US imports
of works of art. The panel includes 158 and 183 exporter countries respectively and uses data from 2003-2012. The dependent variable is the difference
in the reporting gap measured as ln(importsdcyi) - ln(exportsdcyi). Treatment is a US dummy for columns (1)-(5) and Timber dummy for columns
(6)-(10). The control group is imports of timber in the EU-27 for columns (1)-(5) and US imports of works of art for columns (6)-(10). Columns (1)-(5)
include Region by Year, Importer by Exporter and Product fixed effects. Columns (6)-(10) include Region by Year, Exporter and Product fixed effects.
For description of variables, please refer to table 1.1. Regions are defined as North America and the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia,
Oceania, and the Middle East. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by exporter country.
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneous Effect of the Lacey Act on the US Reporting
Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(GDPPCUS) -0.791 -1.030 -1.228 -1.193
(1.550) (1.949) (1.947) (1.979)
Corruption 0.096 -0.013 0.240 0.295
(0.782) (0.768) (0.695) (0.679)
Corruption X Iyear≥2008 -0.576** -0.584* -0.639* -0.633*
(0.232) (0.346) (0.334) (0.327)
Year FE Yes . . .
Exporter FE Yes Yes . .
Product FE Yes Yes . .
Region X Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Exporter X Product FE No No Yes Yes
Product X Year FE No No No Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable .387 .387 .387 .387
Observations 11588 11588 11588 11588
Note: This table reports the heterogeneous effect of the Lacey Act
on US reporting gap for timber. The panel is made of 170 exporter
countries and 21 HS 4 digit product codes for timber, over the period
2003-2012. The dependent variable is the difference in the report-
ing gap measured as ln(importsdcyi) - ln(exportsdcyi). Corruption is
a normalized index, with higher values indicating worse quality of
governance. For description of other variables, please refer to table
1.1. Regions are defined as North America and the Caribbean, Latin
America, Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East. Robust
standard errors in parentheses are clustered by exporter country.
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Table 1.9: Heterogeneous Effect of the Lacey Act on the US Reporting Gap - Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Baseline Weighted QGap AbsGap PosGap PosCensor NegCensor Afr/Asia ROW Arts Toys
Ln(GDPPCUS) -1.193 2.575 -1.497 0.876 0.248 -0.159 -1.035* 1.835 -3.098 0.178 -0.983
(1.979) (3.015) (1.757) (1.467) (2.075) (1.657) (0.539) (3.810) (1.889) (1.737) (2.039)
Corruption 0.295 1.892* 0.245 0.161 -0.237 0.228 0.067 0.833 -0.174 -0.648 0.614
(0.679) (1.064) (0.719) (0.523) (0.661) (0.568) (0.211) (1.319) (0.732) (0.741) (0.688)
Corruption X Iyear≥2008 -0.633* -0.560 -0.594* -0.627*** -0.614** -0.630** -0.003 -1.247* -0.392 -0.337
(0.327) (0.395) (0.337) (0.228) (0.260) (0.265) (0.097) (0.628) (0.388) (0.300)
2004 X Corruption -0.352
(0.230)
2005 X Corruption -0.199
(0.273)
2006 X Corruption -0.607*
(0.314)
2007 X Corruption -0.412
(0.338)
2008 X Corruption -0.975**
(0.477)
2009 X Corruption -0.953**
(0.440)
2010 X Corruption -0.984**
(0.477)
2011 X Corruption -1.077**
(0.429)
2012 X Corruption -0.817
(0.504)
Mean of Dependent Variable .387 .381 -.146 4.49 4.42 2.44 -2.05 1.96 -.315 2.42 .387
Observations 11588 11517 11588 11588 6388 11588 11588 3577 8011 16639 11588
Note: This table reports the heterogeneous effect of the Lacey Act on US reporting gap for timber. The panel is made of 170 exporter countries
and 21 HS 4 digit product codes for timber, over the period 2003-2012. The dependent variable is the difference in the reporting gap measured as
ln(importsdcyi) - ln(exportsdcyi). Corruption is a normalized index, with higher values indicating worse quality of governance. For description of other
variables, please refer to table 1.1. All columns include Region by Year, Exporter by Product and Product by Year fixed effects. Regions are defined
as North America and the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by exporter country.
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Table 1.10: Heterogeneous Effect of the Lacey Act on the Importer Versus Exporter Reporting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Ln(Imports), Mean: 8.90, N:13779
Ln(GDPPCUS) -0.036 -0.755 -1.273 -1.491
(1.114) (1.009) (1.026) (1.094)
Corruption 0.124 0.068 0.247 0.266
(0.449) (0.417) (0.376) (0.387)
Corruption X Iyear≥2008 -0.093 -0.038 0.014 0.000
(0.100) (0.130) (0.117) (0.119)
Dependent variable: Ln(Exports), Mean: 9.57, N:13779
Ln(GDPPCUS) 0.490 0.313 -0.375 -0.428
(0.948) (1.226) (1.284) (1.298)
Corruption -0.371 -0.308 -0.371 -0.401
(0.451) (0.436) (0.451) (0.455)
Corruption X Iyear≥2008 0.488*** 0.542** 0.624** 0.620**
(0.158) (0.241) (0.245) (0.241)
Year FE Yes . . .
Exporter FE Yes Yes . .
Product FE Yes Yes . .
Region X Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Exporter X Product FE No Yes No Yes
Product X Year FE No No Yes Yes
Note: This table reports the heterogeneous effect of the Lacey Act on importer versus exporter
reporting. The panel is made of 170 exporter countries and 21 HS 4 digit product codes for
timber, over the period 2003-2012. The dependent variable is the difference in the reporting gap
measured as ln(importsdcyi) - ln(exportsdcyi). Corruption is a normalized index, with higher
values indicating worse quality of governance. For description of other variables, please refer
to table 1.1. Regions are defined as North America and the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe,
Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by exporter country.
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Table 1.11: Deforestation Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Pixel Count 701.958 890.546 12.298 3764.079 194
Ln(Count) 12.582 1.437 9.417 15.141 194
Corruption 0.021 0.907 -1.59 1.574 194
Ln(Real GDP) 9.816 1.097 7.545 11.809 194
Forest Concessions 12.979 18.276 0 87 194
Note: This table reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical
analysis for the impact of the Lacey Act on deforestation in Indonesia. Pixel count is the
annual average number of 30m x 30m pixels deforested in a given region. Corruption is a
normalized index with higher values indicating worst quality of governance. Real GDP is
measured in billions of Rupiahs and forest concessions are annual average number of
concessions in a given region.
Source: Global Forest Change, Pusat Statistik and Transperancy International Indonesia.
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Table 1.12: The Lacey Act and Deforestation in Indonesia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Count Count Count Count Ln(Count) Count Count
Corruption X Iyear≥2008 -60.110 -81.195 -183.747* -163.615* -0.107 -0.110
(51.804) (54.833) (95.431) (92.174) (0.084) (0.074)
Ln(Real GDP) -825.688** -1035.576** -958.241** -1.219** -1.572*** -1126.364***
(368.298) (372.857) (404.859) (0.567) (0.452) (375.753)
Forest Concessions 13.582** 0.005 0.008* 14.125**
(6.353) (0.007) (0.004) (6.015)
Corruption X 2005 -127.278
(113.087)
Corruption X 2006 41.611
(88.813)
Corruption X 2007 74.536
(110.439)
Corruption X 2008 -50.507
(135.762)
Corruption X 2009 -138.725
(154.480)
Corruption X 2010 -241.679**
(110.407)
Corruption X 2011 -246.626*
(140.514)
Corruption X 2012 -271.948
(203.213)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable
Observations 297 297 194 194 194 194 194
Note: This table reports the effect of the Lacey Act on regional deforestation in Indonesia. Moving from column (5)
to column (6), I lose 11 regions as these regions do not have significant parcels of forests and thus there is no forest
concession data for them. The final panel includes 22 regions and uses data from 2004-2012. The dependent variable
is a count of deforested pixels. Corruption is a normalized index, with higher values indicating worse quality of
governance. For description of other variables, please refer to table 1.11. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by region.
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1.A Appendix A
Table 1.A.1: The Lacey Act and US Imports of Timber vs EU Imports of
Timber - Aggregated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
USA X Iyear≥2008 -0.367*** -0.354*** -0.423** -0.358*
(0.125) (0.126) (0.203) (0.197)
Corruption -0.252 -0.337 0.000 0.000
(0.234) (0.237) (.) (.)
Ln(GDPPCUS) 0.442 0.797 0.000 0.000
(0.565) (0.590) (.) (.)
Year FE Yes . . .
Exporter FE Yes Yes . .
Region X Year FE No Yes . .
Exporter X Year FE No No Yes Yes
Importer X Exporter FE No No No Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 14.1 14.1 14.1 14.1
Observations 2721 2721 2721 2721
Note: This table reports the effect of the Lacey Act on US imports rela-
tive to the EU. The panel is made of importer region (US and EU) by 158
exporter countries over the period 2003-2012. The dependent variable is
the ln(imports) as reported by the importer region. US is an indicator
equal to 1 if importer is the US and 0 if importer is the EU. For de-
scription of variables, please refer to table 1.1. Regions are defined as
North America and the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia,
Oceania, and the Middle East. Robust standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by exporter country.
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Table 1.A.2: The Lacey Act and US Imports of Timber vs Imports of Works
of Art - Aggregated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Timber X Iyear≥2008 -0.694*** -0.671*** -0.627*** -0.799***
(0.112) (0.112) (0.177) (0.172)
Corruption -0.095 -0.047 0.000 0.000
(0.169) (0.175) (.) (.)
Ln(GDPPCUS) -0.036 -0.096 0.000 0.000
(0.551) (0.544) (.) (.)
Year FE Yes . . .
Exporter FE Yes Yes . .
Region X Year FE No Yes . .
Exporter X Year FE No No Yes Yes
Product X Exporter FE No No No Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 13.8 13.8 13.8 13.8
Observations 2841 2841 2841 2841
Note: This table reports the effect of the Lacey Act on US imports rela-
tive to the EU. The panel is made of importer region (US and EU) by 183
exporter countries and 2 HS 2 digit products codes, over the period 2003-
2012. The dependent variable is the ln(imports) as reported by the importer
region. Timber is an indicator equal to 1 if HS Code is 44 and 0 if HS Code
is 97. For description of variables, please refer to table 1.1. Regions are de-
fined as North America and the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, Africa,
Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East. Robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered by exporter country.
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Table 1.A.3: Correlation Between Corruption and Timber Smuggling
Timber - HS code 44 Work of Art - HS code 97
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Corruption 0.901*** 0.428 0.755** -0.477 2.402*** 0.128
(0.220) (0.316) (0.356) (0.773) (0.426) (0.651)
Ln(GDPPCUS) -0.675*** -0.407 0.029 -2.355 0.128 1.972
(0.173) (0.260) (0.353) (1.915) (0.329) (1.528)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region X Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable .387 .387 .387 .387 .387 4.61 4.61
Observations 11588 11588 11588 11588 11588 5421 5421
Note: This table replicates the correlations presented in table 2 of Fisman and Wei (2009) for the reporting
gap in timber and works of art. The panel includes 170 and 182 exporter countries respectively and uses
data from 2003-2012. For description of other variables, please refer to table 1.1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses are clustered by exporter country.
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Table 1.A.4: Heterogeneous Effect of the Lacey Act on the Compo-
sition of US Trading Partners
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(GDPPCUS) 2.983 2.879 2.936 2.968
(2.151) (2.036) (2.164) (2.094)
Corruption 0.333 0.228 0.217 0.178
(0.230) (0.192) (0.200) (0.226)
Corruption X Iyear≥2008 -0.007 -0.005 -0.020 -0.008
(0.099) (0.076) (0.066) (0.055)
Year FE Yes . . .
Exporter FE Yes Yes . .
Product FE Yes Yes . .
Region X Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Exporter X Product FE No Yes No Yes
Product X Year FE No No Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09
Observations 9927 9927 9927 9927
Note: This table reports the heterogeneous effect of the Lacey Act
on exporter country’s share of US Timber imports. The panel in-
cludes 165 exporter countries and uses data from 2003-2012. The
dependent variable is the difference in the reporting gap measured
as ln(importsdcyi) - ln(exportsdcyi). Corruption is a normalized in-
dex, with higher values indicating worse quality of governance. For
description of other variables, please refer to table 1.1. Regions are
defined as North America and the Caribbean, Latin America, Eu-
rope, Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East. Robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by exporter country.
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1.B Appendix B
Figure 1.B.1: 109 Years of Conservation Law Evolves to Protect Timber
109 Years of Conservation Law Evolves to Protect Timber
LACEY ACT PASSED BY 
CONGRESS TO PROTECT 
INTERSTATE TRANSPORT OF 
WILD ANIMALS OR BIRDS
40S, '50S LAW MAKERS 
EXPAND TO COVER 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE.
CONGRESS AMENDED THE ACT AND OTHER LAWS 
TO COVER AMPHIBIANS, REPTILES, MOLLUSKS, 
AND CRUSTACEANS.
CONGRESS REFINED 
PROVISIONS AND PENALTIES 
RELATING TO FISH, WILDLIFE 
AND PLANTS
BILL INTRODUCED ON MAY 22 
2007 IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 
BY REPRESENTATIVE EARL 
BLUMENAUER AND SENATOR 
RON WYDON.
ON MAY 22 2008, CONGRESS AMENDED THE 
LACEY ACT EXTENDING ITS PROTECTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFICKING OF PLANTS 
INCLUDING TIMBER AND ASSOCIATED WOOD 
PRODUCTS.
1900 1930 1969 1981 2007 2008
47
Figure 1.B.2: Schedule of Enforcement
Schedule of Enforcement of the Plant and Plant Product Declaration Requirement* 
(This Version - dated October 29, 2013 - supersedes all previous versions) 
 
HTS Chapters Requiring Plant and Plant Product Declaration (examples of products requiring declaration): 
Ch. 44 Headings  
• 4401— (Fuel wood) ¹ 
• 4402— (Wood charcoal) ² 
• 4403— (Wood in the rough) ¹ 
• 4404— (Hoopwood; poles, piles, stakes) ¹ 
• 4406— (Railway or tramway sleepers) ¹ 
• 4407— (Wood sawn or chipped lengthwise) ¹ 
• 4408— (Sheets for veneering) ¹ 
• 4409— (Wood continuously shaped) ¹ 
• 4412— (Plywood, veneered panels) ² 
 -Except 44129906 and 44129957  
• 4414— (Wooden frames) ² 
• 4417— (Tools, tool handles, broom handles) ¹ 
• 4418— (Builders’ joinery and carpentry of wood) ¹ 
• 4419— (Tableware & kitchenware of wood) ² 
• 4420— (Wood marquetry, caskets, statuettes) ² 
• 4421— (Other articles of wood) ³ 
Ch. 66 Headings  
• 6602—(Walking sticks, whips, crops) ³ 
Ch. 82 Headings  
• 8201—(Hand tools) ³ 
Ch. 92 Headings  
• 9201—(Pianos) ³ 
• 9202—(Other stringed instruments) ³ 
Ch. 93 Headings  
• 9302—(Revolvers and pistols) ³ 
• 93051020—(Parts and accessories for revolvers and pistols)³ 
Ch. 94 Headings  
• 940169—(Seats with wood frames) ³ 
Ch. 95 Headings  
• 950420—(Articles and accessories for billiards) ³ 
Ch. 97 Headings  
• 9703—(Sculptures) ³ 
 
*All declarations submitted must be accurate; false statements may be referred for enforcement. Failure to submit a declaration will not be prosecuted, and customs clearance will not be denied for 
lack of a declaration until after the phase-in date above. 
 
¹ Phase 2 Implementation – Declaration required effective April 1, 2009 
² Phase 3 Implementation – Declaration required effective October 1, 2009 
³ Phase 4 Implementation – Declaration required effective April 1, 2010 
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Figure 1.B.3: Corruption vs Illegal Trade
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Figure 1.B.4: Corruption vs Illega by Regions
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Fig 2A. Africa
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Fig 2B. Latin America
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Chapter 2
More than an Urban Legend: The
Long-term Socio-economic Effects
of Unplanned Fertility Shocks
Power outages or blackouts are a recurrent feature in many developing countries
across the world. Anecdotal evidence has suggested increased fertility rates result-
ing 9 months after the blackout as peoples’ procreation increases when lights go out.
The idea of baby booms following a blackout has been a subject of contention for a
long time. It first came into prominence in popular culture after the great New York
blackout of 1965 which left over 30 million people without electricity for 13 hours.
However, the seminal work by Udry (1970) concluded that there was no significant
impact of the great New York blackout on fertility 9 months later. Since then, the
theory has been termed as an “urban legend" by the President of the Population
Association of America .
Unlike the New York blackout or indeed most power outages in the developed
world, which are limited in time and space, developing countries have been experi-
encing great power uncertainty. Many states in Africa experience rolling blackouts
that last weeks if not months and for several hours a day1. Thus, though the evi-
dence may lack in support of baby booms after a black out in developed countries,
the frequency of blackouts over a longer period of time make it more plausible to
causally link blackouts in developing countries to baby booms 9 months later.
If periods of unexpected power rationing entail baby booms, there may also be
large hidden social costs. The change in fertility behavior has implications for invest-
ment in human capital and asset accumulation in general, affecting the labor market
outcomes and the life path of mothers and their children in the longer run. This
chapter shows that extensive periods of power rationing entail changes in fertility
behavior and that these changes induce large social costs.
1Reliable electricity provision has been identified as a key driver for growth (see Dinkelman, 2011).
In developing countries, electricity supply to firms and households is extremely erratic, constraining
development (see Abeberese, 2012; Fisher-Vanden et al., 2012; Foster and Steinbuks, 2009; Reinikka
and Svensson, 2002)
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Our chapter makes two main contributions. First, we provide evidence that
there is a causal effect of power outages on short and long run fertility. We examine
a particular black out in Colombia caused by the El-Nino droughts in 1992, leading
to a period of almost 12 months of daily rationing of electricity. In order to identify
the effect of the rolling blackout, we construct two novel datasets. First we use
the IPUMS micro sample for the 2005 population census of Colombia to construct
a retrospective mother level birth history by linking mothers to children within the
household. We combine this dataset with municipality level variation in night lights
as measured by satellite images for the period 1992/1993 and construct a variable of
treatment intensity for the power crisis. An ideal experiment would entail random
assignment of the treatment intensity, however, we make do with a quasi-random
experiment: because it was caused by an unforeseen climate change phenomenon,
it was unexpected; it lasted for one year, long enough for sufficient statistical power
to detect the impact on fertility and long run family size; and, it affected the whole
country, thus it was very clearly delimited in time and space. Finally, by using the
retrospective mother data, we estimate the impact of the blackout over time within
the same mother, thus addressing concerns of targeting treatment to specific areas
for political reasons. We document an increase of 0.005 percentage points in the
probability of having a child in 1993. When evaluated at the mean probability of
having a child in any given year, this results into an increase in probability of having
a birth by 5 percent. Using the mean intensity of the power outage across Colombia,
we are able to calculate a back of the envelope estimate of approximately 10,000
additional births in 1993 due to the blackout.
Next, we show that this increase in short-term fertility is not dynamically ad-
justed for through less children in the future, implying an overall increase in total
number of children 12 years later. We use an empirical design on a cross-section
of mothers, where the counterfactual are women, who were exposed to the power
outage but could not physically conceive because they had just delivered a baby.
Additional placebo exercises confirm this finding. Further, consistent with our pri-
ors, younger mothers (aged 30 or less in 1992) respond to the treatment in 1993,
however, they are also better able to adjust their lifetime fertility in the longrun. On
the contrary, though the older cohort has a weaker response to the blackout in 1993,
they are less likely to be able to adjust their lifetime fertility due to an unexpected
baby, thus driving most of our long-run effect. We conclude that 1 out of 10 blackout
babies was not fully adjusted for 12 years later. Given the small size of the short and
longrun effects, we are not surprised that most demographers have failed to find
any significant effects of power outages on fertility.
Our second key contribution is to use the black-out intensity as an instrument for
total fertility, to study the effect of the fertility shock on socio-economic outcomes of
mothers who had an unintended pregnancy. This is a question that is of key interest
to labor economists (see e.g. Angrist and Evans, 1998; Ashcraft and Lang, 2006),
but has mainly been studied in developed country contexts. Our first stage is the
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overall increase in lifetime fertility due to the power outage. We use the variation
in total, unadjusted fertility to study how socio-economic outcomes vary across
mothers. The biggest challenge is to ensure there is no violation of the exclusion
restriction. Of major concern is the fact that the blackout could have a direct effect
on the longrun socioeconomic outcomes of mothers in its own right. Our choice of
control group alleviates many of these concerns, since both treatment and control
were exposed to the power outage (and thus, a possible income shock), but only the
treatment group could physically receive the treatment. This mitigates some of the
major concerns related to the exclusion restriction.
Despite fertility being a complex phenomenon, we are able to paint a consistent
picture of the negative consequences of unplanned motherhood following the black-
out. We provide evidence showing that women who had an unplanned baby due to
the black-out end up with worse education levels and are more likely to be single
mothers living in poorer housing conditions. These findings suggest that there may
have been significant welfare consequences through long-term persistence of the
shock, contrary to life-cycle theory. Finally, to our knowledge this is the first chapter
to link long run socioeconomic outcomes of power rationing on unplanned mother-
hood and more generally the long-run consequences of unintended pregnancies in
a developing country context.
This chapter contributes to several strands of literature. Firstly, it contributes
to a limited but growing empirical literature on examining the impact of electricity
infrastructure in developing countries (see Dinkelman, 2011; Rud, 2012). In particu-
lar, it provides evidence on the influence of infrastructure on fertility behavior. On
this strand, the work most closely related to ours is Burlando (2012), who looks at
the impact of a month-long power outage in Zanzibar on village-level fertility out-
comes. He finds a mini baby boom 9 months after the blackout, with an increase in
village level births by 20%.2
Second, this chapter also contributes to understanding fertility response to other
aggregate shocks. For example, Evans et al. (2008) and Pörtner (2008) study the
effect of natural disasters and hurricanes in particular. They find a negative rela-
tionship between hurricane advisories and baby booms 9 months after the event.
As the type of advisory goes from least severe to most severe, the fertility effect of
the specific advisory type decreases monotonically from positive to negative.3
Finally, we also provide evidence on the long-run consequences of unwanted
pregnancies and the effect of children on their mother’s labor market and socio-
economic outcomes (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Jacobsen et al., 2007). In the Colom-
bian context, this is particularly worrying as unwanted pregnancies and too-early
childbearing are common in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to Koontz
and Conly (1994), women who begin childbearing as teenagers are estimated to have
2In related work, Burlando (2012) finds that in-utero exposure of the mother to the power outage
resulted in lower birth weight.
3Our study also speaks to the literature understanding the role of culture, media and leisure on
fertility (Ferrara et al., 2012; Jensen and Oster, 2009; Kearney and Levine, 2014). These studies have
found a link between television programming and fertility behavior, including smaller family sizes.
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two to three more children than women who delay their first birth until their twen-
ties or later (Gutmacher Institute, 1997). Not only does early motherhood lead to
more children in the future, but high adolescent fertility rates are linked to low
educational attainment and poverty (Koontz and Conly, 1994). In developed coun-
tries the findings are similar, where early motherhood leads to lower education out-
comes, worst housing condition and labor market outcomes (Levine and Painter,
2003; Ashcraft and Lang, 2006; Kaplan et al., 2004).
This chapter is, to our knowledge, the first study to look at mother-level impact
of an aggregate shock like power outages on short and long run fertility outcomes.
This represents a potential improvement over previous studies, which have used
twins and siblings to study the impact on mothers’ labor market outcomes. The
chapter is broader as we do not restrict the sample of mothers to those who only
gave birth to twins for instance, this helps to overcome the external validity concerns
that these other approaches suffer from. Indeed, there is the question of how repre-
sentative are the mothers who respond to the treatment to the general population,
however, given the type of treatment we consider, this is precisely the vulnerable
group one would be interested in when making policy decisions. We also make
significant contributions on the methodological front by combining aggregate night
light data to micro data sets.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief back-
ground the context of the 1992 black out in Colombia. In Section 3, we present a
stylized model that gives us some testable predictions. In section 4 we describe the
data and how we constructed our main dependent variables. Section 5 provides the
empirical strategy and the key results. The conclusion follows in Section 6.
2.1 Context
In 1992 Colombia derived roughly 80 % of its electricity consumption from hydro-
electric sources. About 40% of this energy is produced in fourteen hydro-electric
power plants that are located mainly in the Caldas and Antioquia departments of
central Colombia. These are located to the north and east of Medellin, where the
Mountain ranges of the Andes typically provide ample rainfall runoff water that
may be used for hydroelectric power generation.
Especially Antioquia departmento, highlighted in Figure 2.1.1, is a major loca-
tion for hydro-electric power generation. It has several power plants that are sited
between two rivers, being supplied with water from one and emptying the water
into another after it passes through the turbines. This makes these power plants
particularly vulnerable to reductions in water flows.4
In 1992, El Nino droughts led to a dramatic depletion of water reservoirs that
feed most major power plants. Some power stations needed to cut back power
4Department of Energy, An Energy Overview of Colombia, http://goo.gl/nnhWBN.
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Figure 2.1.1: Colombia Administrative Regions, Night Lights Emissions in 1992 and
Provincial Capital Cities. Antioquia departmento is highlighted.
production dramatically as there was simply a lot less water to produce electricity
with. One of the biggest energy firms estimated that throughout the year there was
a shortfall equivalent to roughly 20% of the annual production of 1991.5
The resulting power rationing was felt by Colombians across the country, which
is why the period from 1992 to 1993 is referred to by Colombians simply as the
“Black Out”. There are no country-wide figures available, as even for some de-
partments, no power production or consumption data is available for that period.
However, for our purposes it is important to note that the short-fall in production
was not evenly spread across the country. In the north-east, historically thermal
power generation from coal has been available and some parts of the South had
not been connected to the national electricity grid. Further, electricity losses along
the transmission lines generate a natural gradient. All these contribute to creating
spatial variation in the intensity of the power rationing.6
Since 1993, Colombia has had a very stable electricity supply. In response to
the power outages and rolling black-outs of 1993, the government heavily invested
in infrastructure and de-regulation of the energy sector.7 The previous period of
5See http://www.tebsa.com.co/history.htm, accessed on 20.06.2013.
6This is akin to Costa (2013), who studies the long run effects of power rationing in the South of
Brazil due to power production shortages following droughts in 2001. The lack of integration in the
power network created distinct spatial variation in the extent of power rationing in his context.
7In particular, a lot of investment has also been made to increase access to on-demand
thermal power plants capacity. According to https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/co.html, the share of hydroelectric power generation capacity is now only
67%.
55
power rationing caused by low hydro inflows due to climate phenomenon was in
1983 (McRae, 2010). Based on various newspaper articles surveyed by us from the
period, timing of the previous drought driven black-out and the strong response of
the government to the shock, all provide support for treating the 1992/93 episode
as un-anticipated.
We now turn to the conceptual framework, before presenting the specification
and our key results.
2.2 Conceptual Model
The Colombian blackout of 1992 might have had an impact on fertility behavior
through different channels. Many people, if not losing their jobs, were forced to
get back home earlier from work, given the scheduled blackout times. Leisure ac-
tivities outside home were less attractive if not more dangerous because of the lack
of nightlight. Inside the household, leisure activities involving electricity became
prohibitively expensive at the running blackout times. All these channels suggest
that the opportunity cost of sex decreased as a consequence of the blackout.
The dominance of these substitution effects is not straightforward, though. If
childbearing is costly, less current income decreases the present value of wealth,
which decreases the affordability of children in the future and therefore reduces
sex activity in the present 8. Additionally, disposition towards sex activity might
decrease as income falls (e.g. stress). These wealth and income effects might dom-
inate the substitution effects and therefore the effect of the blackout on fertility is
theoretically ambiguous.
We identify two channels through which the blackout affects welfare (apart form
those directly related to shortages of energy in the production process). Firstly, if
the substitution effect dominates, population will increase as a consequence of the
blackout. This is the case even if the total number of children across the lifetime
of a woman remains constant. The reason for this is that girls who were born
as a consequence of the blackout would have children at an earlier date than if
they were born later. Consequently, land and capital would be diluted among more
people. Secondly, having children at an earlier stage might affect the life-cycle asset-
accumulation of both parents and children. Parenthood might force early school
retirement for teenage parents when children demand time and money. Unexpected
children might have less access to nutrition and education than those who were
planned.9 For the purposes of the empirical exercise, the conceptual model focus
on the effect on the parent’s asset accumulation.
8As per the 1990 Colombia Demographic Health Survey, condom use was only prevalent amongst
1.6% of the respondents, while 35% of respondents were using no contraceptive method at all.
9Burlando (2014) finds evidence suggesting that in utero exposure to a power outage induced
income effect resulted in lower birth weight.
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2.2.1 Benchmark
We consider a simple model to highlight the channels through which the blackout
affected sexual behavior, pregnancy and fertility in the short run and accumula-
tion of human capital in the long run. We simplify the analysis by assuming that
a woman’s partner chooses the sexual activity frequency disregarding the conse-
quences on her long-term outcomes. Women still have the last say on the number
of children they have and on the education level they want to achieve, but family
planning is costly and education more difficult when resources have to be allocated
to childcare.
The intuition of the effect of the blackout is as follows. Sex is an activity that
rivals in time with working and leisure activities. The blackout increases sex fre-
quency since scheduled blackouts imply shorter working hours. As sexual activity
increases, so does pregnancy. Since family planning is costly, it is not optimal for
woman to fully offset the increase in pregnancy. Childcare rivals in time with study,
therefore reducing woman’s human capital.
To simplify the analysis, we depart from the standard unitary household model.
Instead, women and men assume differentiated roles and do not take into account
the effect their decisions have on their partners. In particular, men choose sexual
frequency disregarding the effect on their partners, while the costs of childcare and
family planning are exclusively assumed by women. In contrast, a forward-looking
household would take into account how sexual frequency affects human capital
acquisition. Earlier versions of this chapter included such a dynamic model, but
the qualitative features of the model remained unchanged. The reader is asked to
excuse us for presenting here a model which simplifies the analysis at the cost of
acquiring sexist undertones.
The problem for a man is to choose the feasible amount of consumption and
time allocated to sex and work that maximizes his utility. His utility depends on
consumption (c) and on the fraction of time spent having sex (s). It is assumed
that u(c, s) is a quasi-concave function increasing on c and s. Sex is costly in terms
of time, hence only combinations of non-negative amounts of x and s such that
x+ s ≤ 1 are feasible. By working a fraction x < β of time, he earns υx, where υ > 0
represents the exogenous wage and β > 0 is an exogenous threshold. If working a
fraction x > β of the time, he earns υβ+ω(x− β), where ω represents the marginal
earnings working after a fraction β of the time.
The problem for a woman’s partner is then
max
s,x,c≥0
u(c, s)
subject to x+ s ≤ 1 and to
c =
υx if x ≤ βυβ+ω(x− β) if x > β
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Denote by x(ω) the optimal labor supply for a man. We assume that for all the
cases of interest it is the case that x(ω) ∈ [β, 1). In particular, if x(ω) ∈ (β, 1), the
solution is characterized by equating the marginal utility of sex with its opportunity
cost:
us(c(ω), s(ω)) = ωuc(c(ω), s(ω)) (2.1)
where s(ω) and c(ω) represent the optimal choices of sex and consumption, respec-
tively.
Women allocate their time between education (e) and childcare. If a woman has
to take care of n children, she has to spend a fraction γn of her time on childcare,
where γ > 0 is a parameter that tells how costly is to raise children. The number of
children n is a function of the frequency of sex activity s, chosen by her partner, and
the level of family planning a, chosen by her. In particular, the number of children
is
n = (1− a)s (2.2)
The monetary cost of family planning is given by c(as), where c(·) is a real-valued,
increasing, continuously differentiable and strictly convex function with c′(0) = 0
and c′(∞) = ∞.
The utility a woman gets is a function of the net income she gets. Her income
is a function of the time she spends on education and the cost of family planning.
The return on education is given by the parameter α > 0. Hence the problem for a
woman is to
max
e≥0,a∈[0,1]
αe− c(as)
subject to e+ γ(1− a)s ≤ 1. Denote by a(ω) the optimal level of family planning
for a woman when her partner chooses a frequency s(ω) of sex. If the optimal level
of family planning is an interior solution, then the marginal cost of family planning
equals its return in terms of income:
αγ = c′(a(ω)s(ω)) (2.3)
The fraction of time spend on education is obtained by noticing that c′(·) is an
invertible function and using the time allocation constraint:
e(ω) = 1− γs(ω) + γ(c′)−1(αγ) (2.4)
At interior solutions, women do not fully offset the fertility choices of their partners.
2.2.2 Comparative statics
The blackout is modeled as a decrease on the marginal earnings from working at the
scheduled blackout times, which is represented as a decrease in ω. Note that if ω
falls to zero, this is equivalent to restricting the number of hours that can be worked
to β. Implicitly, it is assumed that labor and electricity are complementary inputs
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in the production process. As electricity starts to become rationed or prohibitively
expensive, the demand for labor falls, decreasing ω.
Let ω denote the marginal earnings in normal times and ω′ < ω the marginal
earnings during the blackout. From a comparative statics exercise on equation (2.1)
it can be seen that the sign of s(ω′)− s(ω) is ambiguous. This is not surprising: on
one hand, the substitution effect pushes s up as ω decreases. On the other, income
and wealth effects could pull in the opposite direction. Note, however, that if the
fall on ω is big enough, the substitution effect dominates. In the extreme case where
ω drops to zero, then x(0) = β, unambiguously increasing sex frequency.
Let n(ω) and n(ω′) the equilibrium number of children in normal times and
during the blackout, respectively. It follows from equations (2.2) and (2.3) that the
effect on the fertility is given by
n(ω′)− n(ω) = s(ω′)− s(ω) (2.5)
where s(·) is characterized by equation (2.1). If the substitution effect dominates,
the effect of the blackout on fertility is positive.
Testing whether there is an increase in fertility in response to the power outage
will be the first of two steps of the empirical analysis. We study the immediate
short-term fertility effect, but also focus on the dynamic, long-run effect on total
fertility twelve years after the power outage 10.
The second major outcome which we address in our empirical strategy is human
capital. Theoretically, the effect on human capital is given by
e(ω′)− e(ω) = −γ(s(ω′)− s(ω)) (2.6)
which is derived from equation (2.4). The sign of this effect is negative if the substi-
tution effect dominates. We study this empirically in subsection 2.4.3, where we look
at the effect that an unplanned child has on mother-level long-run socio-economic
outcomes.
As discussed in the beginning of this section, the blackout may affect fertility
decisions through other channels. Other leisure activities (e.g. watching t.v.) could
be introduced into the woman’s partner (or the household’s) utility function. The
blackout could be seen as an increase on the cost of carrying out these activities. In
this case, the substitution effect of the blackout would be intensified, the increase
on fertility would be higher and the increase on educational achievement would be
lower.
The next section discusses the data that we are using to study the short- and
long-run effects of power rationing.
10A more dynamic model would capture the long-run adjustment of fertility behavior.
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 Detecting Power Outages from Remote Sensing
Satellite-derived night lights data has been used by economist to map economic
activity (see Doll, 2008), economic growth (Henderson et al., 2012) or the evolution
of agglomeration clusters over time (see Storeygard, 2012; Fetzer and Shanghavi,
2014).
The data has the advantage of being available where reliable GDP statistics do
not exist. Furthermore, they allow the study of the geography of urbanization.
Other recent applications have been in the sphere of political economy, to map the
role of ethnic origin of a leader and the provision of public goods (see Hodler and
Raschky, 2014), again in contexts where data on the provision of these public goods
is not available.
However, to the best of the knowledge of the authors, the night lights data
has not been exploited to study abnormal variation in night-light intensity, which
may be caused by power outages. In that way, the research breaks methodological
ground as we show that the night light data can be used to obtain measures of the
extent to which areas were exposed to power outages.
We study the Colombian context where power rationing was in place from
February 1992 to March 1993. This power rationing was caused by insufficient rain-
falls due to the El Nino phenomenon. This lead to low water levels in the reservoirs
of hydroelectric dams and resulted in significantly less power being generated. The
blackout had some appealing features: because it was caused by an unforeseen cli-
mate change phenomenon, it was unexpected; it lasted for one year, long enough for
sufficient statistical power to detect the impact on fertility and long run family size;
and, since it affected the country, it was very clearly delimited in time and space.
We exploit luminosity data to map the geographic heterogeneity of the extent
to which there was indeed a black-out. There are a lot of reasons why, there was
heterogeneity in the extent of power rationing. One source of heterogeneity is the
geographic distance to the nearest power generating facility. Transmission of elec-
tricity generates natural gradients due to losses in power along the way. Further,
some parts of the country were less exposed due to existing alternatives for power
generation (such as geothermal power generated mainly in the North of Colombia).
Third, the power network was not fully integrated. There were several regional grids
owned by different network operators and cross-border connections to Venezuela or
Peru did not exist. Another reason for heterogeneity may be a political economy
channel - namely, municipalities that were well-connected to the ruling party, may
have been able to lobby for less extensive rationing in their municipality. All of
these points suggest that the effect of power rationing was indeed heterogeneous.
Figure 2.3.1 highlights our approach to measure this heterogeneity indirectly, using
night-lights luminosity data available from US run Defense Metrological Satellite
Program (DMSP).
60
Figure 2.3.1: Light intensity in Colombia, 1992 (left) and 1993 (right) on identical
log-scales along with municipality borders.
The figures depict the luminosity variable around three main urban centers
in Colombia in 1992 (left) and 1993 (right). The northern area is the Medellin
metropolitan area, while in the south is Colombia’s second biggest city Cali. The
light-blob to the right is the metropolitan area of Bogota. The differences in the pic-
tures are dramatic. Especially around Bogota, the broader geographic area appeared
to be completely dark in 1992, while it is lit in 1993.
Note that the nightlight data series is only available from 1992 onward. Hence,
we can not compare the light intensity in the year 1992 (the year of the outage) with
preceding years, as this data simply does not exist. However, we may be able to
compare the 1992 lighting intensity with the intensity in 1993 or 1994. This measure
will, of course, be subject to measurement error since the 1993 luminosity is an
outcome variable in itself. However, as we are studying micro-level data, it is hard
to believe that the micro mother-level variation we exploit has a direct effect on 1993
luminosity. In fact in appendix 2.B we also show the luminosity for 1994 - it is
difficult to argue that the year-on-year variation between 1992 and 1993 is capturing
something other than the power-outage, since the pictures for 1993 and 1994 look
almost identical.
We construct the power outage intensity variable at municipality level as being
essentially the ratio of the average population-weighted municipality luminosity in
1992 over that measure for 1993, i.e. it is constructed as:
Om = 100×
(
1− Lights1992
Lights1993
)
The weighting by population becomes necessary as the IPUMS data merges sev-
eral municipalities that have population sizes less than 20,000 to ensure that users
of the data are not able to reverse-engineer who the individuals in the sample were.
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This makes the treatment intensity construction more tedious and less clean, but
does not represent a significant issue. In total we are left with 515 municipalities
that have population above 20,000.11 The average measure suggests an outage ex-
tent of around 30%. Total luminosity was 30% lower in 1992 compared to 1993.
This maps well into the estimates from Tebsa, a big power generator at the time,
who estimate that the shortfall was around 20% relative to the annual production in
1991.12
Before turning to the empirical specification and the main results, we discuss the
census data that is used throughout the chapter.
2.3.2 Census Data
An analysis that studies fertility effects at the aggregate level may fail to discover
any statistical effect due to low power conjoint with small effect sizes; in addition,
there may be compositional effects as the cohorts of women who have babies in a
municipality changes over time. In order to address this, we construct individual
level birth histories using the 2005 micro sample census of Colombia provided by
IPUMS. The micro-data sample covers 10% of the population at the time and was
hailed to be the most successfully conducted population census.13 For the short run
outcomes, we construct a retrospective panel of mothers using the matched mother
to children data for the period 1990 to 1995. We restrict our analysis to mothers
aged between 18 and 45 in 1993. This ensures that no woman was younger than 15
years old in 1990, the earliest year of analysis in our sample. The panel structure of
the data allows us to identify the effect of the blackout by exploiting within-mother
variation in the timing of birth of babies, instead of cross-region or within-region
variation. This gives us a total number of 624,667 mothers with 369,140 number
of children born in this period. We restrict the short run analysis to a tight 6 year
window, given the dynamic nature of changes in fertility both over time and space.
Due the exogenous timing of the shock, focusing on the years immediately before
and after the blackout allows us to mitigate some of the concerns related to parallel
trends across the different municipalities, which would be needed to study fertility
dynamics over a longer horizon.
For the long run analysis, we exploit the exogenous timing of the blackout
caused by El-Nino rainfall shortages and take advantage of the timing of births,
giving us a quasi-random experiment where mothers were not treated by the black-
out due to biological constraints. We restrict our analysis to comparing women who
gave birth in 1993 to women who gave birth in 1992 and 1991. Further, we only
consider women who have fewer than 8 children. The reason to focus on this group
11Our results are robust to weighting by the geographic size of municipalities. Note that the measure
may actually take on negative values, indicating that there are places that were more luminous in 1992
then in 1993; however, the bulk of the municipalities exhibit a positive measure.
12See http://www.tebsa.com.co/history.htm, accessed on 20.06.2013.
13See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/censuskb20/KnowledgebaseArticle10236.aspx, accessed
20.06.2013.
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of women is driven by the fact that a non trivial number of mothers report having
more than 7 children. This is approximately 10% of the sample of women who gave
birth in 1991/1992/1993. It is very likely that a woman that has 12 children is very
different than a woman that has total number of children closer to the sample mean
of 4. Thus we restrict the sample to this sub-population as it allows us to identify the
impact of an unintended pregnancy on an average woman (especially with declin-
ing fertility rates over time). This leaves us with 55,457, 56,656 and 61,282 women in
the sample for 1991, 1992 and 1993, respectively. The summary statistics for the key
variables in the short and long-run are presented in Appendix 2.A.
We now proceed to detail the empirical strategy and present the main results.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
We separate the empirical analysis into three steps. First, we look at the short run
implications of the power outages on mother-level fertility behavior. Secondly, we
show that these effects persisted - i.e. that the power outage is associated with
a life-time increase in fertility. In the third section we ask how this long-run effect
correlates with economic outcomes for the mothers, thus highlighting the possibility
of there being welfare consequences.
2.4.1 Short Run Fertility Effects
Our dependent variable is a dummy variable Bimt = 1, if mother i from munici-
pality m gave birth in year t. We estimate the following linear probability model
specification
Bimt = ai + bt + γ×Om × Tt + eimt (2.7)
where we include mother fixed effects ai and time fixed-effects bt. We add the
sub-index m for municipality, since the treatment intensity is fixed at municipality
level. The treatment assignment is Tt = 1 for t = 1993, i.e. the year in which babies
conceived in 1992 are being born.14 Note that Tt is perfectly collinear with the time-
fixed effects bt and the power outage measure Om is invariant at municipality level,
thus perfectly collinear with the mother fixed effects ai.
The coefficient of interest is γ, which measures the average difference in the
probability of giving birth for a mother. The interaction term exploits variation
across municipalities in the degree of power-outage intensity measured by Om. The
coefficient γ represents the causal effect of power-outage intensity on the probability
of giving birth under the following assumption. After controlling for mother fixed
effects and exogenous covariates, the changes in probability of birth for mothers
living in municipalities which experienced lower power-outage treatment provide a
14It is clear that this is an Intention to Treat design, as we do not actually observe fertility and mating
behavior around the time, i.e. we can not rule out that some women who were assigned treatment did
actually receive treatment.
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counterfactual for mothers living in municipalities which were hit by higher power-
outage treatment.
Municipality unobserved characteristics could be a source of violation of the
identifying assumption represented by model 2.7. However, unobservable time-
invariant characteristics of municipalities such as geography, history and culture
are not because the set of mother fixed effects in each municipality captures such
municipality fixed effects. On the other hand, due to the short time frame we con-
sider for the analysis (1990-1995), we are not very concerned about time-varying
unobserved factors which may be correlated with the intensity of power-outage and
probability of birth.15
2.4.2 Long-run Fertility Outcomes
The simple theoretical framework is a static one. However, a short-run fertility
shock may be fully compensated by a reduction in fertility in the future. If this
is the case, then we would not expect any persistent effect on fertility due to the
power outage. In particular, we would not expect an effect on the total number
of children in the lifetime of a women that was affected by the power outage, as
increased fertility behavior during the blackout is compensated with less fertility in
later years. Nevertheless, one may still find an effect of unexpected children on the
mother’s socio-economic outcomes.16
We first turn to studying whether women who experienced a fertility shock were
adjusting their fertility behavior later on in life. The key difficulty for this exercise is
to find an adequate treatment and control-group for which a difference-in-difference
methodology can be applied on the cross-sectional data on the number of children
per women that comes from the census. This is not straightforward as cohorts in
different age-groups may be differing in many ways. Hence, it is difficult to verify
a common trends assumption.
Selecting a good counterfactual cohort may help us address issues regarding the
underlying mechanisms. In particular, it is possible that the power outage had a direct
effect on incomes and through that affected long-run outcomes at the mother-level.
This would lead to a violation of the exclusion restriction for our later instrumental
variables exercise. A second concern is that the power-outage may have led women
to become mothers at an earlier age. Since these women are sexually active for a
longer period of time, we would expect them to have, in total, more children. It has
been shown that early motherhood has been found to adversely affect the mother
(see e.g. Ashcraft and Lang, 2006), which would lead to yet another violation of the
exclusion restriction for our exercise.
We will choose our treatment and control group to get the closest possible defi-
nition to highlight the unplanned motherhood mechanism. In particular, we choose
15Another obvious concern is migration. We address this in the robustness checks and show that
our results are robust to studying women who most likely did not migrate in their live up to 2005.
16Since in 2005, most of these children were only 12 years old, we are not yet able to study conse-
quences on the “power outage babies” themselves. This is left to the next census round.
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our control group such that both treatment and control were exposed to the power
outage (and thus, a possible income shock), but only the treatment group could
physically receive the treatment. To address the channel of early motherhood affecting
socio-economic outcomes, we present results for a constrained sample of mothers
both in the control and treatment group who had given birth at least once before
1992 and 1993, respectively.
With this in mind, we chose the control group as women who gave birth during
1992, the period in which the blackout occurred. These women were, if anything,
only partially treated. It is clear that a women who gave birth in 1992 may have
been affected by changing fertility behavior but could not physically conceive for
the months she was pregnant during the blackout for obvious reasons. In addition,
these women are biologically less likely to be responsive to treatment in form of
changing fertility behavior. Post-delivery, the likelihood of having another child
immediately is very low as post natal care takes up a large chunk of the mothers
time. As per the sample, only 3.4 per cent of the women gave birth in both 1992
and 1993. Hence, women who gave birth in 1992 were exposed to the treatment
in many ways but were physically constrained to be responsive to any changes in
sexual behavior during the black out. Thus, they can constitute a control group for
women who gave birth in 1993.
The treatment group is thus women who gave birth in 1993, while the control
group is women who gave birth in 1992. As a placebo check we compare women
who gave birth in 1992 to women who gave birth in 1991. 17
This assignment of treatment and control group constitutes a very good coun-
terfactual, as their age-profiles and hence their physiological fertility profiles are
very similar since they reproduced around the same period of time. Furthermore,
the choice of treatment and control group helps us rule out alternative mechanisms
that could violate our instrumental variables identification strategy for the effects of
unplanned motherhood on socio-economic outcomes of the mother.
The specification we estimate is a difference in difference specification. This
allows us to test the impact of the blackout on total number of children 12 years
onwards, comparing women who gave birth in 1993 to women who gave birth in
1992.
In particular, we estimate:
tchami = bma + β1Ti + β2Om + β3Ti ×Om + Xim ′pi + eami (2.8)
where tchami is the total number of children born to mother i in municipality m
in a ten year age cohort a. The variable bma is a set of municipality-age-fixed effects.
These control for common shocks to women of the same age in a municipality. These
fixed-effects are very demanding, but take out a lot of age specific heterogeneity
17Since the treatment was for a year, while pregnancy lasts for only 9 months, it is possible for a
mother to have given birth twice in two years. Our first stage is robust to the exclusion of mothers
who gave birth in both years. A balance check is presented in Table 2.A.3. Not conditioning for the
control variables we include in the regression, the treatment and control groups compare quite well.
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that could be due to age or time-specific events at municipality level. Note that
in this setup, we can not control for mother-fixed effects, as there is only cross-
sectional variation in the dependent variable. The variable Om measures, as before,
the intensity of the power outage in 1992. Treatment is assigned to mothers i in
municipality m that gave birth in 1993, while this variable is set to zero for mothers
in municipality m who gave birth in 1992. Xim contains other time-invariant controls
fixed at the mother level.18
2.4.3 Long Run Impacts on the Mother
We can now turn to the third pillar of the analysis. Namely, we want to shed light
into whether the persistent part of the fertility shock had some long-lasting effects
on the lives of the mother or the family environment in which the mothers live.
In order to do this, we exploit the variation in nightlights as an instrument for the
total number of children, allowing us to shed light on the impact of unplanned
babies on the life-path of mothers and the family in which children are brought up.
It is important to highlight that this design only captures the differential effect of
increased total lifetime fertility due to the power outage and does not capture any
effects that may be due to an unplanned child that did not result in an increase
in lifetime fertility. Even though our treatment effect is on a very specific subset of
women, nevertheless, we think this is an important contribution to the existing labor
economics literature, which has highlighted the role of the family environment for
long-term outcomes of household members.
As a preview of the forthcoming results, we first establish that the power outage
had persistent effects on the total number of children born to a mother i. Next we
use this variation to explore other margins through which a mother i was affected
through having a “power outage baby”. We proceed with an IV estimation whereby
we exploit the arguably exogenous variation in power-outage intensity that resulted
in more babies being born. These additional children may affect women, as they
may have to give up e.g. further education. They also may have had to enter the
workforce at a younger age, which allowed them to build up assets earlier, even
though their lifetime earnings prospects may be significantly lower.
The relevance of our instrument is ensured by the persistent effects of the power
outage on longrun total number of children. The exclusion restriction requires that
there is no other channel through which the exposure to the power outage inten-
sity Om had an effect on some outcome ymai for a women i of age cohort a living
in municipality m. We explore some falsification exercises that suggest that the ex-
cludability of the instrument is indeed satisfied. The first stage for our Instrumental
Variable specification is simply specification 2.8 from the previous section. We use
the first-stage to generate fitted values for the total number of children and then
18These include an indicator variable for the ethnicity status (mainly to control for indigenous pop-
ulations) at the mother-level and some indicator of whether the location of the mother within the
municipality is a population center, a head-town or dispersed population.
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estimate:
ymai = bma + θ × ˆtchmai + η1Ti + η2Om + X′im × ß + νami (2.9)
The coefficient θ measures the rate at which a mothers’ socio-economic outcomes
change for an additional child that was born due to the power outage. Since we only
capture variation in total fertility for the women who did not dynamically adjust
their fertility in the years after the power outage, this is a specific local average
treatment effect. The socio-economic outcomes we study at the mother level from
2005 are: ownership of accommodation, quality of accommodation, whether they
are single mothers, whether they are self-employed or graduated from university.
We now present the key results from each of the tree steps of the analysis.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Short Term Fertility Effect
The first set of results pertains to the short term fertility increases due to the power
outages. These are presented in Table 2.1. The estimated coefficients on the inter-
action term between power outage intensity and treatment are positive and signif-
icantly different from zero. In column (2) we add time fixed effects, in column (3)
we add municipality fixed effects and in column (4) we replace municipality fixed
effects with mother fixed effects. At first, it may seem surprising that the coefficient
remains very stable and does not change when adding the mother fixed effects.
However, we may see this exercise as evidence that the treatment was quasi ran-
dom, as adding the fixed effects does not change the estimated coefficient, which
is what we would expect if treatment was quasi random. In column (5) we add a
control for economic development as measured by the log of lights in municipality
m 19. Finally we control for department trends in column (6). Even in the most de-
manding specification, our estimate remains stable and precisely measured. A 100%
increase in power-outage intensity (i.e. complete blackout relative to previous year)
increases the probability of having a birth by approximately 0.005 percentage points.
A 0.005 percentage point increase is an increase of 5% in the probability of giving a
birth in a given year when evaluated at the mean probability of giving birth. At the
mean power-outage intensity of 32%, we estimate the additional number of children
born due to the power-outage to be 9,994.20 How does this compare to the total ex-
pected number of children being born in this period? Given a mean probability of
19We use the mean lights to control for economic development as a time varying control. For years
prior to 1992, we replace the light measure with the 1992 data as the satellite images are only available
from 1992 onwards. Under the assumption that in the very short run, spatial development is time
invariant, the 1992 light measure should be a good proxy for 1990 and 1991.
20We arrive at the figure by scaling up the point estimate by 10 and then multiplying it by the mean
black-out intensity of 0.32, by the number of women in the estimation sample. This implies, given our
point estimate of 0.005, that there are 0.005× 0.32× 624, 667× 10 = 9, 994. We multiply by 10, since
the census micro-data pertains to only 10% of the population.
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giving birth of 9.9%, on average, 624,667 babies would have been born. Hence, we
can estimate that 1.6% of the babies born were “power outage babies”. Column (7)
presents evidence on heterogeneous treatment effect. There is strong support for
differential cohort effects. Most of the impact of the power-outage is being driven
by the younger cohort who were aged between 18 and 33 in 1993. The effect on the
older cohort is positive but marginally insignificant, possibly indicating that these
women are less likely to be biologically responsive to the shock. The results indicate
that the effect-sizes are relatively small, which may explain why demographers have
failed to find evidence using aggregated data (see Udry, 1970).
We consider a few robustness checks to ensure the validity of our results. Col-
umn (1) of table 2.2 presents the preferred specification from table 2.1. Since the
census sample was conducted in 2005, a major concern with our results is that
mothers may have moved across municipalities since 1993, thus biasing our power-
outage intensity assignment. If this is due to pure randomness, we would expect
our measure to be noise and thus lead to attenuation bias. On the other hand if the
re-location choice of the mother is correlated with some unobserved characteristic
of the municipality in 1993, we would have biased estimates for the effect of power-
outage on probability of birth. In order to address this, we restrict our sample to
women who are born in the same municipality and have lived there all their lives.
In column (2), we present the results of the sub sample and re-assuring, our point
estimate remains stable. In column (3) we carry out a placebo test by re-assigning
the treatment year to be 1992, reflecting children born who were conceived in 1991.
Since 1991 was a normal year with respect to electricity provision, we would not
expect any differential impact of power-outage intensity for children born in 1992.
Indeed we find a smaller and statistically insignificant coefficient. In column (4) we
use a different measure of the power-outage intensity and find that the point esti-
mate for γ remains robust to the alternative measure of power-outage intensity 21.
In column (5), we control for log luminosity 22 to account for any economic devel-
opment that maybe correlated with our measure of power outage. Our measure of
power outage still predicts fertility, Columns (6) and (7) explore some asset owner-
ship interactions; as these are measured in 2005, they are likely endogenous and it
becomes clear that no pattern emerges.
We now turn to the study of the persistent effects of the power outage on total
fertility.
21The alternative measure is constructed by using the share of pixels that were lit in a given munic-
ipality rather than the mean value of lit pixels. This measure tries to control for measurement error in
the average lights by just assigning a value equal to 1 if a pixel had any positive light and 0 otherwise.
The construction of the outage intensity is done exactly in the same way by comparing total lit pixels
in 1993 to total lit pixels in 1992.
22log luminosity is measured as the log of total number of lit pixels in the municipality.
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2.5.2 Incomplete Adjustment of Fertility Effect
The temporary fertility effect demonstrated in the previous section may be dynami-
cally offset by having fewer children in the future. In this section we document that
this is not the case. We study a cross section of total births for women in 2005. The
results from this analysis are presented in table 2.3.
Column (1) is a simple difference in difference regression without any controls.
The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and highly significant. This means
that the mothers who gave birth due to the power outage were unable to fully
compensate by having fewer future children relative to mothers who gave birth just
a year prior to the power outage. In columns (2) and (3), we add municipality
age fixed effects and mother level controls respectively. Column (3) suggests that
if a municipality was exposed to 100% blackout in 1993, then approximately every
10th mother in the treatment group within the municipality is likely to have one
more child compared to the control group. Thus, out of the 9,994 power outages
babies estimated in the previous section, approximately a 1000 babies were not fully
adjusted for 12 years on. Evaluating at the mean power-outage intensity, we obtain
an upper bound of 1,961 additional number of children 12 years later23. Column (4)
and (5) report some robustness checks to ensure our results are indeed meaningful
and do not simply capture differential trends between the cohorts. In column (4) we
present a placebo check. We perform the same exercise comparing women who gave
birth in 1992 to women who gave birth in 1991. Since there were no power outages
in either of the two years, there is no reason to believe that the blackout should
have any significant impact on the long run total number of children for these two
groups of women. Indeed the difference in difference estimator is close to 0 and
insignificant. In column (5) we look at the long run outcome by age groups. The
heterogeneous treatment effect gives us a natural placebo, since younger cohorts
have more time to adjust their fertility behavior, we would expect the impact to be
smaller for them. Indeed, majority of the long run effect observed is being driven
by the older cohort who potentially were not able to adjust their lifetime fertility
post the black out. The coefficient for the younger cohort is smaller and positive,
but marginally insignificant, indicating that there may still be younger women who
have not been able to fully adjust to the unanticipated fertility shock.24
It becomes evident that the power outage had a significant effect on the number
of children born for the treated cohort. This suggests that there is incomplete adjust-
ment and an increase in total fertility. We can not say much about why total fertility
has increased, especially for the cohorts that could feasibly adjust. However, we can
use these results one step further to answer the question on what are the impacts
on the mother who had an unplanned child and was constrained in adjusting total
fertility?
23We arrive at this estimate by multiplying the estimated coefficient of 0.1 by the 61,282 mothers
who had a child in 1993 by the mean outage intensity of 0.32
24Since total number of children is a count variable, we present the same specification using a
Poisson model. The results remain robust to the Poisson model and are presented in Appendix 2.C
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2.5.3 Long Term Effects on Mothers’ Socioeconomic Outcomes
Bringing up a child is costly as it requires time spent away from working or obtain-
ing a degree. In addition, women who had an unplanned child may find themselves
in more unstable relationships. We study these questions using the increase in total
fertility due to the power outage as a natural experiment for an instrumental vari-
ables design to estimate the local average effect of having an unplanned child. The
results from this exercise are presented in table 2.4.
Column (1) presents the preferred first stage specification. In columns (2) and
(3), we see that they were more likely to own the accommodation they live in, but
this accommodation tends to be of lower quality. The quality of the accommodation
is an index that takes a maximum value of four if the accommodation has dirt-floors,
no solid walls, use of wood fuel and no access to running water.
In column (4) we find that women who were subject to the power-outage induced
fertility shock were more likely to be single-mothers in 2005, possibly reflecting the
social cost of having unwanted babies. We do not find any effect of an extra child
on the likelihood of self employment, see column (5). However, they are less likely
to have graduated from university, see column (6). The last column serves as a
placebo check. Here we see whether the total number of children had an effect on
the mother’s primary school educational attainment. As this was predetermined
before the mother was in child-bearing age, it is reassuring that the total number of
children appear not to have an effect on this outcome. It is important to highlight
that the IV strategy provides some distinct results, compared to the simple OLS
estimation of the above specifications.
Finally in table 2.5, we repeat the above exercise, but for the constrained sample
of women who are not first time mothers. Column (1) presents the first stage results,
which remain significant but become less precise. The IV estimates remain quali-
tatively similar to including all women in the sample, however they lose precision
due to the reduction in sample and a weaker first stage.
These results taken together paint a very interesting picture. It suggests that
there were persistent effects on women, who had more children in total due to the
power outage. These women are living in less stable family situations, as they are
more likely to be single mothers. One potential explanation could be because the
child was not planned. There are also repercussions on the educational attainment,
with women not taking higher education. However: there are also some more
positive results. Women may have had to enter the labor force at a younger age due
to having a baby. This makes it more likely that these women can accumulate assets
and own the house in which they live.
From the perspective of a social planner however, the unplanned parenthood is
likely to entail social costs that are further evolving dynamically. The worse living
conditions of mothers may translate dynamically into lower levels of educational
attainment for the children, as they may not be able to finance an education for
the children. In addition, if population growth is a concern to planners, the overall
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increase in total fertility due to the power outage is a first order concern.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter set out to analyze the impact of vast power rationing in Colombia in
the early 1990’s on fertility behavior. This is the first attempt to evaluate the impact
of power rationing on population dynamics, going beyond the question whether
power outages may cause “mini baby booms”.
Such research was not possible, because we lacked good data on electricity con-
sumption. However, we highlight that the satellite based night-lights measures
maybe used to identify places which were subject to power rationing and periods of
blackout.
We use this measure to show that women who live in areas in which the power
rationing was more severe, were more likely to give birth in the year following the
rationing period. This suggests that there are indeed “mini baby booms”. How-
ever, we take these results further to answer the question whether fertility behavior
dynamically adjusts over time.
We find that there is persistence, as women do not fully adjust their overall
fertility. Finally, we show that the power-outage induced baby boom had long run
consequences for the mothers. This suggests that there are significant “hidden cost”
to variable or low quality infrastructure.
In order to equip policy makers in developing countries that face periods of
severe power rationing, further research needs to be carried out to understand the
timing of load shedding and its effect on fertility, so as to minimize the hidden social
cost of blackouts.
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Table 2.1: The Impact of Power Outage Intensity on Birth Probability
Different Fixed Effects Age Specific
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Outage Intensity x Treated 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.457***
(0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164)
Outage Intensity x Treated x Younger than 30 0.650**
(0.266)
Outage Intensity x Treated x Older than 30 0.290
(0.201)
Mother FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FE No No Yes . . . .
Department Trends No No No No No Yes No
Mean Birth Probability .0985 .0985 .0985 .0985 .0985 .0985 .0985
Observations 3748002 3748002 3748002 3748002 3748002 3748002 3748002
Number of Groups 515 515 515 515 515 515 515
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered at the municipality level.
Outage x Intensity measures the proportional change in municipality-level luminosity between 1992 and 1993. The dependent variable is an
indicator variable equal to one, in case the mother experiences a birth in a given year. Note that the municipality fixed effects are perfectly
collinear with the mother fixed effects in specifications (4) - (6). The coefficients are multiplied by 100.
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Table 2.2: Robustness of the Short-Run Fertility Effect of Power Outages
Robustness to Measures and Specification Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Non-movers Placebo Lit Pixels Total Luminosity Electricity Assets
Outage Intensity x Treated 0.475*** 0.437** 0.257 0.302*** 0.512*** 0.185 0.411
(0.163) (0.198) (0.191) (0.105) (0.196) (0.548) (0.284)
Outage Intensity x Treated x Electricity 0.312
(0.587)
Outage Intensity x Treated x Assets -0.003
(0.125)
log(Luminosity) -0.001
(0.001)
Mother FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Birth Probability .0985 .103 .0985 .0986 .0977 .0985 .0985
Observations 3748002 2163630 3748002 3660234 3645339 3748002 3748002
Number of Groups 515 515 515 502 508 515 515
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Outage
x Intensity measures the proportional change in municipality-level luminosity between 1992 and 1993. Column (2) restricts the analysis to mothers
whose location of birth is the same as the present location. Column (3) moves the treatment one year earlier. Column (4) uses a different measure of
the outage as being simply the change in the share of lit pixels between 1992 and 1993. Column (5) controls for total luminosity in a municipality.
The coefficients are multiplied by 100.
73
Table 2.3: The Persistent Effects of Power Outage Intensity on Total Number of Children
Different Controls Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outage Intensity x Treated 0.088*** 0.093*** 0.094*** -0.043
(0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.036)
Outage Intensity x Treated x Older than 30 0.109**
(0.043)
Outage Intensity x Treated x Younger than 30 0.041
(0.026)
Outage Intensity 0.464***
(0.085)
Muncipality x Age FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother Controlls No No Yes No Yes
Mean Number of Children 3.55 3.55 3.54 3.55 3.54
Observations 103676 103676 101044 98499 103337
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors in the parentheses are
clustered at the municipality level. Outage x Intensity measures the proportional change in municipality-
level luminosity between 1992 and 1993. Treated women are women who gave birth in 1993 while control
group women are women who gave birth in 1992. The dependent variable is the total number of children
born up to 2005. Column (4) is a placebo where we assign treatment to women who gave birth in 1992 and
control group to women who gave birth in 1991. Column (5) shows that the persistence is mainly driven
by women who cannot physically adjust their long term fertility anymore due to their age. Mother controls
include an indicator variable for the ethnicity status (mainly to control for indigenous populations) and some
indicator of whether the location of the mother within the municipality is in a population center, a head-town
or considered to be dispersed population.
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Table 2.4: The Persistent Effects of Power Outage Intensity on Socio-Economic Status of the Mother
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First Stage House Low Quality House Single Mom Self-employed University Placebo
Outage Intensity x 0.093***
Treat (0.031)
Instrumental Variables
Total Children Born 0.280** 0.479** 0.163* 0.496 -0.119** -0.125
(0.128) (0.216) (0.093) (0.472) (0.059) (0.112)
Ordinary Least Squares:
Total Children Born -0.009*** 0.098*** -0.000 0.004** -0.022*** -0.079***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Reduced Form:
Outage Intensity x 0.027*** 0.046** 0.016** 0.039** -0.010** -0.011
Treat (0.010) (0.018) (0.007) (0.018) (0.004) (0.010)
Municipality x Age Group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 3.55 .603 .789 .129 .22 .0514 .638
Observations 103676 102721 102287 103358 30521 102800 102800
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Treatment
indicates mothers who gave birth in 1993, while control group constitutes of women who gave birth in 1992. Outage Intensity measures the proportional
change in municipality-level luminosity between 1992 and 1993. The table presents the IV, OLS and the Reduced Form results in separate rows. The
dependent variable is given in the column head and are various socio-economic variables of the mother measured in 2005. Column (1) is the first
stage. Column (2) studies whether a mother owns the house in which she lives. Column (3) is an index for housing quality. Column (4) is an indicator
whether the mother is a single mom. Column (5) studies an indicator whether the mother is self-employed, while column (6) studies whether the
mother has some university education. Column (7) is a placebo test where the left hand side is a dummy indicating primary school completion, which
is predetermined in the treatment year.
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Table 2.5: The Persistent Effects of Power Outage Intensity on Socio-Economic Status of the Mother : Robustness to Not First
Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First Stage House Low Quality House Single Mom Self-employed University Placebo
Outage Intensity x 0.118***
Treat (0.045)
Instrumental Variables
Total Children Born 0.227 0.354 0.092 0.048 -0.093* -0.221
(0.153) (0.243) (0.086) (0.196) (0.055) (0.136)
Ordinary Least Squares:
Total Children Born -0.009*** 0.099*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.017*** -0.080***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Reduced Form:
Outage Intensity x 0.025* 0.039 0.011 0.008 -0.010* -0.023*
Treat (0.015) (0.025) (0.009) (0.032) (0.005) (0.014)
Municipality x Age Group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 4.08 .635 .882 .126 .235 .0364 .58
Observations 57332 56811 56584 57020 15172 56637 56637
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Treatment
indicates mothers who gave birth in 1993 and had already given birth at least once before 1993, while control group constitutes of women who gave
birth in 1992 and have given birth at least once before 1992. The sample is restricted to those mothers whose birth in 1993 was not their first birth.
Intensity measures the proportional change in municipality-level luminosity between 1992 and 1993. The dependent variable is given in the column
head and are various socio-economic variables of the mother measured in 2005. The left hand sides for column (2) - (6) are given in the column heads.
Column (1) is the first stage, while column (7) is a placebo test where the left hand side is a dummy indicating primary school completion, which is
predetermined in the treatment year.
76
2.A Appendix: Summary Statistics
Table 2.A.1: Summay Statistics for Short Run Analysis
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Birth (dummy) 0.1 0.3 0 1 3748002
Outage Intensity 0.29 0.26 -0.38 1 3748002
Outage Intensity (lit pixel share) 0.32 0.38 -2.03 1 3690818
TV ownership (dummy) 0.72 0.45 0 1 3574890
Electricity (dummy) 0.92 0.27 0 1 3748002
Refrigerator (dummy) 0.63 0.48 0 1 3591732
Total Number of Assets Owned 2.02 1.62 0 6 3748128
Aged between 18 and 29 in 1993 0.51 0.5 0 1 3748128
Source: 2005 micro sample census of Colombia.
Table 2.A.2: Summary Statistics for Long Run Analysis
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Outage Intensity 0.32 0.27 -0.38 1 162526
Indigenous (dummy) 0.17 0.37 0 1 161350
Mother’s age 40.8 6.33 31 58 162526
Age in 1992 27.8 6.33 18 45 162526
Total Children Born 4.08 2.38 1 24 159023
House Ownership (dummy) 0.62 0.49 0 1 160215
Cheap Housing 0.87 1.13 0 4 159458
Single Mom (dummy) 0.13 0.33 0 1 162024
Self Employed (dummy) 0.23 0.42 0 1 45801
University Degree (dummy) 0.05 0.21 0 1 160034
Primary School Completion (dummy) 0.59 0.49 0 1 160034
Source: 2005 micro sample census of Colombia.
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Table 2.A.3: Summary Statistics: Comparison Between Control and Treatment
Group for Long Run Analysis
Control Treatment P-val
Variables N Mean N Mean
Outage Intensity 56656 0.320 61282 0.324 0.015
Indigenous (dummy) 56265 0.173 60816 0.174 0.558
Mother’s Age 56656 40.791 61282 39.997 0.000
Mother’s Age in 1993 56656 27.791 61282 26.997 0.000
Total Children Born 55436 4.140 59981 4.148 0.599
House Ownership (dummy) 55810 0.623 60618 0.610 0.000
Cheap Housing (dummy) 55533 0.896 60302 0.915 0.005
Single Mom (dummy) 56455 0.126 61116 0.125 0.641
Self Employed (dummy) 15822 0.225 16808 0.223 0.803
University Degree (dummy) 55777 0.046 60305 0.047 0.439
Primary School Completion (dummy) 55777 0.589 60305 0.590 0.682
Source: 2005 micro sample census of Colombia. P-value is the significance level of a t-test
comparing the means of the respective variables in each row between the treatment and control
groups.
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2.B Appendix: Luminosity for 1994
As mentioned in the text, we lack luminosity data for the period before 1991, which
would be the adequate control year for the construction of the power-outage inten-
sity. However, the night light data is only available from 1992 onwards. That’s why
we had to compare the 1992 luminosity to the 1993 luminosity to construct the out-
age intensity variable. The following graphs depict the luminosity also for the year
1994 on the same scale. This highlights that the changes in luminosity from 1992
to 1993 is far from any “normal” year on year variation in luminosity, suggesting
that we are really capturing the effect of the power outage through that variable
correctly.
Figure 2.B.1: Light Intensity in Central Colombia, 1992 (left), 1993 (center) and 1994
(right)
2.C Appendix: Further Tables, Results and Robustness Checks
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Table 2.C.1: Robustness of Total Fertility Effect to using a Poisson Model
Different Controls Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outage Intensity x Treated 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** -0.011
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Outage Intensity x Treated x Older than 30 0.027**
(0.011)
Outage Intensity x Treated x Younger than 30 0.011
(0.007)
Outage Intensity 0.129***
(0.024)
Muncipality x Age FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mother Controlls No No Yes No Yes
Mean Number of Children 3.55 3.55 3.54 3.55 3.54
Observations 103676 103643 101012 98478 103304
Notes: Significance levels are indicated as * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Regressions for a conditional fixed effect
Poisson model. Standard errors in the parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Outage x Intensity
measures the proportional change in municipality-level luminosity between 1992 and 1993. The dependent
variable is given in the column head.
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Chapter 3
“American Idol” - 65 Years of
Admiration
Almost every December since 1948, Gallup has conducted an opinion poll in which
it asks an open-ended question “what man/woman that you have heard or read
about, living in any part of the world, do you admire most?” The result usually
forms the basis for a few news articles at the end of the year1 . But the winner
is very rarely a surprise - the male competition is almost always won by the US
president and the female competition has been won by Hilary Rodham Clinton for
15 of the past 17 years and before her was mostly won by foreign female political
leaders or the wife of the President or an ex-President. Table 3.1 gives the list of
winners. But what is more interesting is that the winning share of the vote varies
considerably over time and is often low - for example, in 2013 Barack Obama won
with 15% of the vote and Hilary Rodham Clinton with 16% - so that most votes are
going to someone other than the winner.
This chapter analyses responses to the ‘most admired’ question for the period
1948-2013 focusing not on the specific individuals who are named but on the type
of individuals e.g. whether they are politicians, celebrities, businessmen or fam-
ily/friends. There are a number of reasons why this exercise is interesting. First,
the description of the way in which the responses have changed can tell us some-
thing interesting about the way social attitudes have been evolving over 65 years.
Arguably this is the longest run of data on social attitudes on a consistent basis that
exists. Second, we argue that there is a robust correlation between admiration and
trust. Specifically, a correlation between admiring the president and trust in gov-
ernment2. Using this link we can provide evidence on trends in trust from the late
1940s, at least a decade earlier than is available from other sources. Third we inves-
tigate the link between admiration and media coverage showing there is a robust
1A summary of the winners and the most recent years’ results can be found at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1678/most-admired-man-woman.aspx. There are also some spin-
offs from this survey e.g. Yougov’s survey of most admired in many countries of the world
http://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/01/11/infographic-bill-gates-most-admired-world/
2It is true that the level of trust in the US congress is very low, however the time series data for
trust in federal government and congress track each other surprisingly well.
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positive correlation between being admired and newspaper coverage.
The chapter is structured in the following way. In the next section we describe
the data and the way we categorize it. The second section documents the type of
people who are admired and the trends in the types over the 60-year period. The
most common type of response is current or former presidents or vice/presidents,
followed by those who respond, “don’t know/ no one” each receiving about a quar-
ter of votes over the whole period. Other politicians and religious leaders each
get about 10%, family and friends about 5% with the rest of the votes quite widely
spread. Only a small number of respondents name someone from the world of busi-
ness, entertainment or sports. In terms of trends, there is a remarkable similarity
between the pattern of responses today and in the early 1950s suggesting that not
much has changed. But there were large changes in the intervening period - the
share of votes for the president/vice-president fall (e.g. Bill Clinton won in 2000
with 7% of the vote) before recovering with the categories of don’t know/ no one
and other politicians rising and then falling.
While these trends are perhaps interesting in their own right, their significance
is less clear. The third section summarizes the disparate literature on the nature
and purpose of ‘admiration’, arguing that admiration reflects a good opinion of the
person admired, telling us something about the types of people and actions that
are thought of as praise-worthy. This suggests that we think of the nature of the
responses to the ‘most admired’ question as a form of social capital, specifically an
indicator of trust. If, for example, one says one admires the president this might
suggest one trusts the government. And if one admires no one then perhaps one is
less likely to trust others.
The fourth section of the chapter explores these hypotheses using a number of
data sets. We use the Civic Culture data set from Almond and Verba (1963) (the only
data we have been able to find containing questions on both admiration and trust)
to show the links between admiring different types of people and trust, providing
support for the hypothesis of a link between admiration and trust. In addition,
using the General Social Survey (GSS) and the American National Election Study
(ANES) we show how the characteristics that predict answers to questions on trust
also predict answers to the admiration question. In particular we find that those
who report that they admire the president are more likely to trust the government
and those who admire no one are less likely to trust others.
The relationship between admiration of the president and trust in government
also holds in the time series as well as the cross-section i.e. the year-to-year varia-
tion in the admiration of president/vice-president tracks variation in trust in gov-
ernment. Using this link we can argue that trust in government was high from
the late 1940s but rose further during the 1950s and perhaps peaked around 1960.
The admiration data gives us 10 earlier years of data on trust in government before
the ANES data starts. However, we do not find a strong correlation between the
year-to-year variation in the propensity to report that one admires ‘don’t know/no-
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one’ and generalized distrust. We argue that this is partly the result of the way
the Gallup survey responses are coded with ‘don’t know’ and ‘no-one’ being only
distinguished after 1977, and partly that responses to questions on generalized trust
are quite variable (e.g. the ANES and GSS measures do not always show consistent
trends).
The fifth section of the chapter investigates the connection between the media
and admiration. We show there is a robust positive correlation between the number
of votes received in the ‘most admired’ poll and the number of mentions in newspa-
pers, even once one controls for person by year fixed effects and is using variation
across states.
Our conclusion is that the ‘most admired’ data series allows us to investigate the
way in which attitudes have changed over a very long period of time on a consistent
basis, much longer than is common in studies of this type, so is a valuable resource
for social scientists.
3.1 The ‘Most Admired’ Survey and Data
3.1.1 The ‘Most Admired’ Question
The main data used in this chapter comes from Gallup’s most admired man and
woman poll which has been conducted at the end of virtually every single year
since 1948 and the individual data have been deposited in the Roper Centre (see,
for example, Gallup, 2010). In the poll, Americans are asked, without prompting, to
say what man and woman “living today in any part of the world, do they admire
most?” Although the basic question has remained unchanged for 65 years, there
have been some minor variations in the framing of the most admired question. Prior
to 1960, respondents were asked to name the most admired man/woman, however
after 1960, respondents were asked about both their most and second most admired
man/woman. In 1999, the way in which the second most admired person was asked
changed so that respondents were asked to name up to two most admired persons -
the number of 2nd responses fell dramatically. In order to have the longest possible
run of consistent data, our main analysis only uses first responses though results
using second responses are very similar.
Further, in order to maintain consistency between polls over time, we restrict
our analysis to years in which the question asked was the same to ensure no bias
from framing of the question. Thus we drop data for 1969, 1976 and 1999 when the
question asked varied significantly from the other years. We do not have any data
for 1962, 1964, 1968, 1986, 1991 and 2006, as the survey was not carried out in those
years. 1975 is another year, which is excluded as an abnormally large number of
responses were coded as miscellaneous. Finally we drop the years 1960 and 1978,
as the data dictionary was not coded properly. In total we use 54 out of the 66 years
for analysis.
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3.1.2 The Coding of Responses
Although the question is asked in an open-ended format and the response is not
restricted in any way, the coding of those responses has varied somewhat over time
so the individual data sets are not completely consistent over time. The way in
which the coding has changed over time is best explained through the general types
of responses.
First, there are those responses, which refer to what we might call ‘public fig-
ures’ that are people who generally would not know the respondent personally.
The most common responses are always identified by name but the number of in-
dividuals so identified has varied over time with a maximum of 144 in 1952 and a
minimum of 13 in 1990. In the earliest years the individuals with a small number
of responses are recorded by type (e.g. religious leaders, businessmen) and there
are some years in the 1950s where it appears that every public figure listed by a
respondent is identified in the data set passed down to us. But in later years it is
only the individuals with the largest number of votes who are identified by name
and the rest are grouped into an ‘other’ category. In our main analysis we artificially
limit the number of recorded public figures with rank less than or equal to 13 for
men and 11 for women (these being the smallest number of names identified in any
specific year) and assign all the rest to an ‘unidentified’ category. But the Appendix
does show that our main conclusions seem robust to the problem that we cannot
identify the type of person for those in the ‘Unidentified’ category.
The second big category of responses are those that refer to people who are not
public figures but are known to and know the respondent - these can be grouped
together as ‘family and friends’. There has always been a category of this type.
The final category is those who either refuse to answer the question, who say
that they don’t know and those who respond ‘no one’. In the earliest years the
don’t know/no one/refused are combined in a single code but after 1992 there is
a separate code for refused. These two categories are not exactly the same, as one
might know whom one admires but refuse to answer the question. But, in practice,
the numbers refusing the question are very small - only 0.76
In most, but not all years, the responses ‘don’t know’ and ‘no one’ are coded
separately but there are some years where they are coded together (see Table 3.A.1
in the Appendix for details). These responses are not the same - ‘no one’ suggests
some degree of thought has been given to the answer whereas ‘don’t know’ perhaps
suggests an absence of thought (though it is not clear that more thought would elicit
a response). In most of our analysis we group these two responses together in order
to have the longest run of data but there is some indication, discussed later, that the
difference between ‘no-one’ and ‘don’t know’ is significant.
Where we have a named person we classify them according to the type of person
they are. Our categories are chosen on the basis of those that are most frequently
mentioned though the bulk of votes are taken by a small number of categories. Our
chosen categories are:
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• Current or Past Presidents or Vice-Presidents (or their wives in the case of
women)
• Other American Politicians
• Foreign Political Leaders
• Religious Leaders
• Celebrities (Media, Arts and Sports)
• Business Persons
• Academics and Experts
In addition, we have the ‘don’t know/no one’ category, ‘friends and family’, and
the ‘unidentified’.
There are some ambiguities in classifying particular individuals and we try to
use the appropriate category at the time they are mentioned. For example, Arnold
Schwarzenegger is mentioned twice in 1987 when we classify him as a celebrity and
14 times in 2003/4 when we classify him as a politician. But there are some cases
that are more tricky e.g. is Jesse Jackson a religious leader or a politician (we put
him in the latter category), is Ross Perot a businessman or a politician (we classify
him as the latter as he only appears after his political campaigns). Our detailed
classification is available online - while some may dispute some of our classifications
we do not think our results are likely to be altered with one notable exception. The
exception is Hilary Rodham Clinton who at some point probably moved from being
a first lady (her first mention is in 1993) to being a politician in her own right.
The question specifically asks about a living person. So, for example it seems that
in 2013 some people responded Nelson Mandela and this was not a valid answer.
But starting in 2000, the response God/Jesus appears seemingly allowing for the
validity of the Resurrection and the fact that God is a man. To avoid controversy,
we classify the handful of such responses as a religious leader.
3.2 A First Look at the Data
We start by looking at the broad categories of responses. The first panel of Table 3.2
presents - by decade - the fraction of first responses by different types of individual
for men and Table 3.3 does the same for women. At this stage, we use the broad list
of categories defined at the end of the previous section in order to make clear that
no category we omit in the later analysis is quantitatively important. The first panel
uses our preferred form of the data, using first responses only and restricting the
number of named individuals to 13 a year for men and 11 for women.
However, to show that our results are not sensitive to these decisions the second
panel reports all first responses (in which the number of named individuals varies
by year) and the third panel includes second responses (years prior to 1960 are
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excluded as the question is not asked and after 1999 when a change in the routing
means there are very few second responses).
The first column of Tables 3.2 shows the fraction of responses in different cate-
gories over the whole period 1948-2013 inclusive. For men, the category with the
largest vote share is distributed between the don’t know/ no one category with
27% and the president/vice president category with 26% of all votes. This is fol-
lowed by religious leaders with 9%, other politicians with 7%, international political
leaders with 5%, and all other categories with a very small share (apart from the
unidentified category). For example, it has always been the case that only small
numbers of people cite businesspeople and celebrities as their most admired per-
son, so there is no evidence here that US society is becoming increasingly materi-
alistic or celebrity-obsessed. It is the domination of politicians in general and the
president/vice-president in particular that is most striking.
Table 3.3 does the same for women - here the category of president/vice-president
is replaced by a relative of them, most commonly their wife. A higher proportion
say don’t know/no one for women than for men. But, overall the pattern of re-
sponses is very similar. Comparing the first with the second and third panels, one
can see that our modeling choices to ensure consistency do not hide any important
patterns.
These figures refer to the 65-year period as a whole over which a lot may have
changed. So the second through seventh columns of Table 3.2 and 3.3 break up the
responses by broad decade. Comparing the 2000s with the 1950s perhaps the most
striking feature of the data is how little has changed - in both periods about one-
third cite the president or vice-president, about one quarter cite don’t know or no
one (slightly higher in the later period). But this masks quite dramatic change in the
intervening years - the share admiring the president or vice-president slumped to
15% in the 1970s with the loss of support going to the don’t know/no one category
and to unidentified others. Table 3 shows similar trends in the types of women who
are admired.
Because Tables 3.2 and 3.3 group years into decades and there might be impor-
tant within-decade trends, we group the responses into 4 main categories in what
follows - those who name a president/vice-president, those who name no one or
say they don’t know, those who name someone else who is a public figure, and
those who name family and friends. The trends in the vote shares for these four
categories are shown in Figure 3.1 for men and Figure 3.2 for women the three dif-
ferent measures - the adjusted first responses, the raw first responses and the first
and second responses.
Although the responses are clearly influenced by short-term events and there is
considerable year-to-year variation in the proportions responding in various cate-
gories, there are also longer-term trends that are observable. To make these clearer
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 also report for men and women a 5-year moving average of the
results for the adjusted first responses.
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For the fraction reporting a president/vice-president there is a rise in the propor-
tion from the late 1940s until a peak in the early 1960s when about 40% of respon-
dents named the president/vice-president. There is then a long period of decline
reaching a low point of 6.5% in 1974. There was then a recovery to about 20% in the
1990s before a startling rise to over 40% in 2001. Since then there has been a general
decline though with a rise in 2008, when Barack Obama was first elected. We are
currently in a period of declining support for the president/vice-president though
it is hard to say where this will eventually go. There are some obvious events that
one might suggest lie behind some of these trends - for example, the Vietnam War,
Watergate and 9/11. In the fourth section we investigate the correlation with other
measures of trust in government.
Turning to the fraction reporting don’t know/ no one, this was stable at about
20% in the 1950s before then rising to about 30% in the period 1970-2000 though with
considerable variation from year-to-year. It fell after 9/11 but has since bounced
back to about 20%, now though in 2011 it was above 30% again.
But the rise in the share of don’t known/ no one; in the 1960s and 1970s
only makes up for about half of the striking fall in the vote share loss for the
president/vice-president in this period. The other half of the decline went to the
‘unidentified’ category i.e. votes became much more dispersed. Figure 3.A.1 and
3.A.2 in the Appendix provides information about the composition of the unidenti-
fied group for male and female most admired persons.
This section has documented the trends in the type of person who is admired in
the United States. But, while the description of these trends is interesting, we need
to have an interpretation about the nature and purpose of admiration in order to
attach any significance to them - that is the purpose of the next section.
3.3 Interpreting Admiration
Philosophers, psychologists and political scientists have been interested in admira-
tion - its nature and purpose - since at least Classical Greece. Here we provide the
briefest of overviews (see Brennan and Pettit, 2004, for more extensive discussion)3.
3.3.1 What is Admiration?
Many have offered a definition of admiration e.g. Adam Smith in the Theory of
Moral Sentiments wrote that “the sentiment of complete sympathy and approba-
tion, mixed and animated with wonder and surprise, constitutes what is properly
called admiration” (Smith (2002), p58). In more recent academic work, admiration
3It should be noted that Brennan and Pettit (2004) seek to distinguish between esteem and ad-
miration in a way that we do not. They are at pains to emphasize that esteem (in their sense) and
admiration, while sharing the feature of being evaluative are distinct with esteem being directive (in
the sense of conveying an action to be emulated) while admiration is non-directive (p21-22). We are
not so convinced that the question ‘who do you most esteem’ would elicit very different answers from
‘who do you most admire’ so think esteem and admiration are closer in practice than their analysis
would suggest.
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is generally classed as one of the moral emotions (Haidt (2003)) in the family of
other-praising emotions. For example, in the global categorization of emotion types
(Ortony et al., 1988, pp. 145) claim that admiration is one of the ‘appreciation’ emo-
tions and defines it as the emotion that is “a reaction of approval for some praise-
worthy action”. Different authors differ in the extent to which related emotions are
seen as simply different words for the same underlying emotion or different variants
of emotion4. For example, Ortony et al. (1988), group admiration with appreciation,
awe esteem and respect but(Brennan and Pettit, 2004, pp. 21-22) seek to distinguish
between esteem and admiration though admitting they do share important features.
And some authors seeks to make distinctions in terminology for academic purposes
- for example, Algoe and Haidt (2009) use the term admiration to refer to non-moral
excellence (e.g. sporting excellence) and use elevation for moral excellence5. But -
as they acknowledge - this does differ somewhat from common usage and many
respondents might struggle with the question ‘what living person do you elevate
the most?’
And it is the common usage meaning of admiration that will be useful in ex-
plaining our data and it is likely that this does not mean exactly the same thing to
all our respondents. But it does seem plausible to think that all people have a good
opinion of those they say they admire the most. One way of illustrating this is that
individuals are named much less frequently after being engulfed by some scandal
with Watergate being the most prominent example (Nixon drops from 9% in 1972
to 5% in 1973 and never recovers).
3.3.2 The Purpose of Admiration
A long line of thinkers from at least Ancient Greece onwards have argued that
admiration is important in human society. But there are a number of arguments put
forward for why admiration is important.
First, there is the idea is that individuals want to be admired and this encourages
them to behave in ways that make them admired. The benefit from admiration
might be in material terms e.g. one’s economic relations go more smoothly with
those who admire you, or it might be desired for its own sake. According to this
latter view, humans evolved a desire for admiration (see Henrich and Gil-White
(2001), for one theory of why this might have evolved and Plutchik (1980), Frank
(1988) and Ekman (1992), on why emotions in general might have evolved).
Secondly, there is the idea that the purpose of admiration is not to influence how
4There is also a neurological study of the areas of the brain that are triggered by the feeling of
admiration (Immordino-Yang et al. (2009)). This study distinguishes between admiration for virtue
(i.e. for someone who has done something ‘good’) and admiration for skill (i.e. for someone who has
a high level of achievement) and shows that while these emotions activate some similar areas of the
brain, they also activate different areas suggesting they are not exactly the same emotion even though
the single word ‘admiration’ can be used for them
5It is not clear that this distinction is well-supported by their own data - for example as many
respondents used the word admiration to describe their feeling in a condition meant to induce a
feeling of elevation as they did in the condition designed to produce a feeling of admiration (p110).
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others behave but to influence how we behave ourselves. Algoe and Haidt (2009)
quote Thomas Jefferson “When any . . . act of charity or of gratitude, for instance,
is presented either to our sight or imagination, we are deeply impressed with its
beauty and feel a strong desire in ourselves of doing charitable and grateful acts
also”. According to this view, the admiration (or elevation to use Jefferson’s term)
of acts inspires us to seek to emulate that behavior i.e. the purpose of admiration
is to influence our own actions. They also suggest that the act of admiration may
simply make us happier. According to this view, the type of people we admire tells
us about who we aspire to be.
Thirdly, there is the view that we have a pre-disposition to admire certain types
of people -for example, Cuddy et al. (2008) argue that we admire those who we
think are both ‘competent’ and ‘warm’ i.e. successful others whose actions benefit
oneself. They also argue that we tend to ascribe these virtues to those who are
high in the social hierarchy and that this helps to provide order in society (see also
Sweetman et al. (2013)). Adam Smith, was of a similar view that we tend to admire
those of high status - “our obsequiousness to our superiors more frequently arises
from our admiration for the advantages of their situation, than from any private
expectations of benefit from their good-will” ((Smith, 2002, pp. 63)) - though he did
not think it necessarily a good thing - “that wealth and greatness are often regarded
with the respect and admiration which are due only to wisdom and virtue; and
that the contempt, of which vice and folly are the only proper objects, is often most
unjustly bestowed upon poverty and weakness, has been the complaint of moralists
in all ages” ((Smith, 2002, pp. 72)).
But even if we understand why individuals like being admired, we also need
an explanation of why we admire others. One view is that we expect direct returns
from those we admire - that is obviously implausible in most of the cases in the
Gallup survey, as one cannot credibly believe that to admire the President leads to
personal gain. Another view is that we have evolved an automatic ability to admire
others that then helps to motivate those who are admired. And a third view is that
individuals get a direct utility from admiring others - that the act of admiring makes
individuals feel good or that those admired act as role models about how we would
like ourselves to be (see, for example, Algoe and Haidt (2009)).
According to all of these interpretations of what it means when we admire some-
body, it seems valid to conclude that it tells us something about position in the social
hierarchy, what behaviors we view as pro-social or who we would like ourselves to
be. And it is clear that the types of behavior and people that are admired vary across
cultures and over time within a single culture (see, for example, Appiah (2011), for
some examples of dramatic change in what is admired). So changes in the types
of people who are admired might reasonably be used to infer something about the
way in which values are changing.
Because of the connection with admiration with how one views the behavior of
others, we might expect that admiration data is linked to, though not identical to,
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measures of social capital in general, and trust in particular, something that has been
argued to be of critical importance in underlying successful societies (e.g.Fukuyama,
1996; Putnam, 2001). That there might be such a link is perhaps not surprising -
saying that one admires no one suggests that one does not have a high opinion of
the moral worth of others as does saying that one does not think most people can
be trusted. The next section investigates the hypothesis that there is a link between
admiration and trust.
3.4 Trust and Admiration
Although one might find the results to this point intriguing, we have done little to
establish their significance. In this section we investigate the link between admira-
tion and trust, perhaps the most widely used measure of social capital (though there
is controversy about the meaning and interpretation of responses to trust questions
- see, for example, Glaeser et al., 2000; Uslaner, 2002; Nannestad, 2008; Johnson and
Mislin, 2012).
To establish the connection between trust and admiration we turn first to the
one study we could find in which there is a measure of both trust and admiration in
the same data set - this is the classic book by Almond and Verba (1963), a study of
the civic and political culture in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy
and Mexico6. It involved a questionnaire (conducted in 1958 in all countries except
the US, where it was conducted in 1960) that asked a variety of questions about
political and civic attitudes and involvement7. Of interest for our purposes is that
it asked a question about admiration, which took the form “aside from people you
know personally – of all the, people you hear or read about, could you name one or
more individuals you admire very much”. This is quite similar to the question in
the Gallup survey though explicitly excludes the ‘family and friends’ category as a
possible response. Although the question asks for a specific person, the responses
are grouped by type of person in the data set available to us, fortunately using very
similar categories to the ones we have used. The responses are tabulated in Table
3.4, with a comparison of the Gallup survey responses for the same year. The two
surveys for the US have a similar pattern of responses - politicians are the most
common answer, followed by don’t know/ no one. But, they are not identical -
entertainers are mentioned more frequently than religious leaders in the Almond-
Verba survey but not in the Gallup survey. We also include the responses for other
countries as a comparison.
Turning to trust, the Almond-Verba survey asks a number of questions about
trust: “some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can’t be
too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?” (this is the
classic generalized trust question) as well as “If you don’t watch yourself people will
6We mostly discuss the questions used in chapter 9.
7This data set is available through ICPSR - Almond-Verba (2009).
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take advantage of you. Do you agree or disagree with that?”, and “human nature
is fundamentally cooperative. Do you agree or disagree with that?” Almond and
Verba (1963) documented relatively high levels of trust in the US and UK and lower
levels elsewhere, with very low levels in Italy - this is shown in the lower panels
of Table 3.4. But, of more interest to us is the correlation with the responses to the
admiration question. Table 3.5 presents the US data distinguished by the type of
person who is admired. The first panel shows that those who report they admire
no one or don’t know have markedly lower levels of trust than those who report
admiring a politician or an entertainer (though similar levels to the small group
who admire others). However, the second panel shows that those who don’t admire
anyone are less likely to think one has to watch oneself lest people take advantage.
The third panel shows there are no marked differences in beliefs about whether
human nature is fundamentally co-operative. The Almond-Verba questionnaire also
asked directly about the character qualities that are admired i.e. we do not have to
infer them from the type of person who is admired. Results are presented in the
final panel of Table 3.5. The most common response is that people admire those who
are generous (mentioned by almost 30% of people) followed by 16% who admire
someone who does his job well, and 15% each for those who are respectful and
keeps himself to himself8. But there are significant differences between the qualities
admired by those who admire someone and those who report don’t know/ no one.
The latter group are less likely to admire those who are generous and more likely
to admire those who keep to themselves. The over-riding image is that those who
reply don’t know/ no one are more isolated individuals not embedded in a social
structure that they have faith in.
To investigate further the relationship between trust and admiration, we do a
regression analysis investigating the characteristics that are associated with admir-
ing someone and being trusting. As characteristics we include gender, age, race,
education and political affiliation. The results for such a model in the Almond-
Verba data set are reported in Table 3.6. The most consistent finding is that those
who are more educated are more likely to admire someone, to trust others, and to
think others don’t take advantage of you. Non-whites are significantly less trusting
but, although they are less likely to report admiring someone this difference is not
significant. Of course, there are other factors apart from the ones we control for
that influence both admiration and trust. The correlation in the residuals among
the first three columns in Table 3.6 are positive suggesting that those unobserved
factors that cause someone to admire someone also cause them to trust others. Next
we investigate the hypothesis that there is a single underlying factor causing both
admiration and trust which can be modeled as the hypothesis that the coefficients in
the different columns are proportional - the chi-squared test statistic for this hypoth-
esis is reported in the ‘beta proportionality test’ row of Table 3.6. One accepts this
hypothesis. Finally, as a comparison, the final two columns of Table 6 also report a
8Note the masculine nature of the responses is in the original survey.
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regression model for the Gallup data for the most admired man and woman for the
years around the period of the Almond-Verba study - the determinants are similar.
Overall, the Almond-Verba data does support the hypothesis that there is a link
between admiring someone and measures of trust. But, this is data from one year
over 50 years ago and this link might not apply at all times. Unfortunately there is
no way to check directly whether this relationship holds in other years because we
do not have data sets containing questions on both admiration and trust. But we
can look for indirect evidence by seeing whether the demographic characteristics
associated with distrust are also associated with admiring no one. For this exercise
we use data on trust from the American National Election Study (ANES) and the
General Social Survey (GSS).
Table 3.7 presents the results. The first two columns report results where the
dependent variable is the measure of generalized trust in the GSS and the ANES.
The regressors included are race, age, gender, religion, political affiliation, political
affiliation interacted with the party of the incumbent president, year and region
dummies. These variables are chosen partly because they are standard demographic
variables but also because they are available on a consistent basis in all surveys. We
did experiment with including some other variables (e.g. employment) that were
only asked in some surveys but they were never significant and we present the
specification with the largest number of observations. The college educated, the old
and men are more likely to trust others, non-whites and political independents less
likely to9. The results for the GSS and the ANES are very similar and our results are
similar to those presented in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) who are able to include
a wider set of explanatory variables as they are not constrained to variables that
appear in multiple data sets.
The third and fourth columns of Table 3.7 report estimates of models where the
dependent variable is trust in the federal government using questions from both the
GSS and ANES. In both surveys the college educated and democrats are more likely
to trust the government, as are Catholics. The old in both surveys are less likely to
trust government. There is also a large negative effect if the incumbent President is
not from the party you support. But there are also a number of variables - race and
gender where the coefficient is differently signed in the two datasets.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.7 analyze the Gallup admiration data to investigate
the factors associated with admiring different types of people. To keep the analysis
of the Gallup data relatively simple, we aggregate the responses into three main
categories, president or vice-president (relatives of politicians for women), all oth-
ers and don’t know/ no one. Since there is no natural ordering of the three major
classifications, we estimate a multinomial logit specification for the type of person
admired. We choose the classification Don’t know/ No One as the reference cate-
gory. The coefficients presented in the table are multinomial log-odds ratios. The
standard interpretation of the multinomial logit is that for a unit change in the pre-
9More variables are significant in these regressions than in the Almond-Verba data because the
sample size is much larger.
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dictor variable, the logit of outcome m relative to the reference group is expected to
change by its respective parameter estimate given the other variables in the model
are held constant. For instance, the coefficient on Age is significant for All Others.
Thus the interpretation of the coefficient would be that for an increase in Age by
one year, the multinomial log-odds for All Others relative to Don’t know would
be expected to decrease by 0.005, while holding all other variables in the model
constant.
The results in column 5 of Table 3.7 suggest that the older you are, the more
likely you are to name the President or Vice-president and less likely to say some-
one else relative to the referent group Don’t Know/ No One. Relative to Protestants,
Catholics are more likely to vote for a member of the Society (which also includes
religious leaders) as opposed to Don’t Know/ No One. All religions have a lower
preference for the President or Vice-President relative to the Protestants while peo-
ple with minority religions or no religion are more likely to say Don’t Know/ No
One than All Others when compared to Protestants. Regarding respondent’s po-
litical affiliation, Democrats, Independents and Other parties are more likely to say
Don’t Know/ No One than name a person, may it be the President or Vice-president
or anyone else. Finally, the higher the education you have, the more likely you are
to vote for someone instead of saying Don’t Know/ No One when compared to
persons with less than college education.
Column 6 of Table 3.7 presents the same analysis for most admired females.
Like most admired males, age seems to be negatively correlated to naming a most
admired female relative to saying Don’t Know/ No One. Non-white respondents
are more likely to say a female name than Don’t Know/ No One. On the other
hand, men are more likely to say Don’t Know/ No One then name a most admired
female. Regarding the respondent’s religion, Catholic and Jewish persons are more
likely to mention a most admired female compared to Protestants, while persons
of no religion or minority religions are less likely to name a most admired female.
Democrats have a positive correlation with naming Relatives of Politicians as op-
posed to saying Don’t Know/ No One when compared to Republicans. This may be
driven by the dominance of Hilary Clinton as the most admired female over the last
15 years. Consistent with findings regarding education and most admired males,
we observe the same relationship with respect to most admired females; the higher
the schooling you have, the more likely you are to vote for someone instead of say-
ing DonâA˘Z´t Know/ No One when compared to persons with less than college
education.
The rows at the bottom of Table 3.7 labelled ‘Trust People GSS’ etc take the esti-
mated coefficients from the different regressions in Table 3.7, compute the predicted
values of trust and the probability of admiring a particular type of person and then
sees whether these are positively correlated or not. We adopt this procedure be-
cause we do not have data where we observe both trust and admiration in the same
data set and this provides a simply way to see whether the types of people who, for
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example, admire the president are also likely to trust government. The correlation
between the predicted levels of admiration for the president/vice-president has a
correlation of 0.46 and 0.47 with the predicted level of trust in government i.e. there
is a strong positive relationship. There is also a strong negative correlation between
the predicted level of admiring ‘No one’ and trust in both people and government.
Again, we see a link between the admiration and trust data.
This relationship is a cross-sectional one and we might also be interested in
whether the variation over time in admiration and trust is also correlated. To in-
vestigate this we compare trends in measures of trust in government from the GSS
and ANES with the fraction of persons voting for the president or vice-president
from the Gallup data. Figure 3.5 and figure 3.6 show the time series variation 10.
As is well-known (see, for example, Alford (2001)) trust in government fell precipi-
tously in the 1960s and 1970s before recovering somewhat, then spiking up around
9/11 and falling back subsequently. Both the figures also show the fraction of re-
spondents admiring the president or vice-president - the correlation with trust in
government is very clear showing, again, the link between admiring politicians and
trust in government.
This is interesting because it allows us to infer something about trust in gov-
ernment in the 1950s before we have very good data. White (1982) argued that
the 1945 victory had a positive effect on the view of government that lasted for a
generation. But, some doubt has been cast on whether the 1950s were so ‘golden’.
For example, Bennett (2001) uses a handful of studies (e.g. Hyman and Sheatsley,
1954; Mitchell, 1959) reporting responses to a rather disparate set of questions (thus
making identification of trends difficult) before the ANES data starts in 1958, argu-
ing that American attitudes to government and politicians were ambivalent in that
period. And (Hodge et al., 1966, table 7), using some NORC surveys of the prestige
of a wide range of occupations found that political/government occupations were
one of only two broad occupational groups (the other being businessmen) where
occupations had declined in prestige from 1947-1963. However the Gallup data on
the admiration of the president/vice-president suggests that trust in government
was at a very high level in the 1950s though it did peak around 1960.
We performed the same time-series exercise for generalized trust, relating it to
the fraction reporting ‘don’t know/ no-one’ - however we fail to see any meaningful
correlation between the two measures. There are a number of possible reasons why
the cross-section relationship does not translate to the time-series for generalized
trust. One caveat of the Gallup data is the way responses have been grouped. In
particular, until 1977 (other than for 3 years in the late 40’s and early 50’s) the
responses were grouped together if one admired no-one or said don’t know. Since
admiring no-one is clearly distinct from saying don’t know, it is not surprising
10All of the estimates in Table 3.7 include year effects, so assumes that the impact of different
regressors does not vary with time. The Appendix presents some figures to show this is a good
assumption in the data - the year-to-year variation in the type of person admired is very similar for all
demographic groups and the time series variation is larger than the cross-section variation.
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that we do not observe any strong correlation between generalized distrust and
responding ‘don’t know/ no-one’. However, we are able to carry out the same
exercise for the years in which there is distinct coding of the two responses. The
GSS has asked a question on generalized trust since its inception in 1972 and, as can
be seen from Figure 3.7, this shows a downward trend at least since 1980 though
with considerable volatility. The ANES has asked a question about generalized
trust in a number of years back to 1958 (there are also some earlier surveys - see, for
example, Smith (1997) but it is hard to argue these are consistent) - these are shown
as points in Figure 3.7 as to join them up and infer a trend is potentially misleading.
Figure 3.7 shows that while there is volatility in this measure of generalized trust
from the admiration data, it does pick up the fall since 1980 as seen in the GSS data,
which has been the subject of widespread interest and research (e.g. Putnam, 2001;
Uslaner, 2002; Robinson and Jackson, 2001; Clark and Eisenstein, 2013; Nannestad,
2008, for an overall review). One should also note that the series on generalized
trust from the GSS and ANES also do not show a strong correlation even though
they are responses to the same question - this is perhaps because responses are
sensitive to framing and context - see (Smith (1997)). Although considerable caution
is obviously warranted here the fraction reporting that they admired ‘no-one’ in the
early 1950s was at very low levels, consistent perhaps with generalized trust being
high in that period.
Using this link between admiring no-one and generalized trust, we can speculate
about trends in trust prior to the start of the GSS in 1972. The admiration data
suggests that generalized trust was on a downward trend from peaking in the late
1940s. Interestingly, the peak in generalized trust in Putnam (2001) analysis of trends
in social capital occurs almost a decade later in 1960, though he too lacks a long and
consistent time series on generalized trust. However, without granular data for the
missing years, it is difficult to make any definite claims.
In this section we have argued that there is a link - albeit imperfect - between ad-
miration and trust. Admiring the president or vice-president is most closely linked
to trust in government and admiring other persons linked to generalized trust. This
link exists in both the cross-section and the time series. That there might be such
a link is not surprising - social capital is about group formation and these groups
very rarely have formal contracts governing who is supposed to do what. As a re-
sult one has to trust people and have a favorable view of their public-spiritedness,
something that naturally leads to admiration of others.
3.5 Media and Admiration
In this section we attempt to investigate the role of the media in influencing who, if
anyone, is admired. The role of the media has been hotly debated in the literature
on social capital - for example Putnam, 2001; Norris, 1996; Newton, 1999 inter alia.
The form of media we consider here are newspapers. There are two advantages
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of using newspapers over other forms of media. First, newspapers have been around
for a long period of time, thus giving us significant time variation and second,
newspaper markets are geographically divided by the extent of circulation and local
news component. The data for media’s influence on cultural role models is obtained
from the NewspaperArchive.com. It is the largest newspaper archive online with
130 million-page database that captures coverage from valuable local newspapers
throughout North America, the U.K., and select countries from 1607 to the present.
Because of its focus on small newspapers, researchers can search for newspapers
and keywords by disaggregated locations up to the state level. Further, print media
allows us to get variation in coverage both over time and over space. We use the
database to search for complete names to construct a spatially disaggregated count
of newspaper presence for each named person mentioned in that specific year and
state.
We normalize the media presence of name i in each state s and year t by the
news count of the most commonly used words. Thus the newspaper presence is
defined as:
Nist =
count_o f“name”ist
count_o f“that/would”st
and standardized for ease of interpretation.
Table 3.8 presents summary statistics related to the variables used in the analysis.
After cleaning the data, we remain with an unbalanced panel of 9,403 Name by
State by Year observations. As a first indication that there is a correlation between
media mentions and being admired we plot in Figure 3.8 the time series of the
measure of mentions of different types of people and the levels of admiration of
those types. The positive correlation between the two measures is very clear. But this
does not establish a positive correlation between admiration and media mentions of
individual people. To investigate this we report some statistical models in Table 3.9.
Given the nature of the data, a Poisson regression is appropriate since the de-
pendent variable is a count and often a small number. Since the sampling is not
representative at the state level, we have some states with more unique mentions
than number of respondents in other states. To address this issue, we create a yearly
balanced panel (i.e persons mentioned in state ‘A’ may not be named in state ‘B’,
we replace mentions for people who are not mentioned in a given state with zeroes)
for the empirical analysis. But we do not include in our sample individuals who
received zero votes in all states in any year.
Indexing name by i, state by s and years by t, our problem may be stated as one
of estimating:
Vist = β0 + β1Nist + X′istβ j + eist (3.1)
Where X denotes a vector of observed individual characteristics and eist de-
scribes unobserved contributors to voting response in the survey. We are interested
in the coefficient of N, the news elasticity of votes.
The first column of Table 3.9 shows that the number of mentions Nist in the
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Gallup data is positively correlated to newspaper presence when we do not control
for any other factors. The second column then includes controls for age and being
non-white. Whites are more likely to be admired, as are the old. But the inclu-
sion of these controls makes little difference to the estimated link between media
mentions and admiration. Adding in year (column 3), region (column 4) or state
(column 5) fixed effects also makes little difference to the estimated link. This rela-
tionship between media mentions and admiration is unsurprising - if someone has
done something admirable in a year one is both more likely to be mentioned in the
newspapers and in the Gallup data.
But the positive relationship between media mentions and admiration also holds
(albeit weaker) if one includes name fixed effects (column 6) and name-year fixed
effects (column 7). In this last specification we are effectively controlling for what
an individual has done in a particular year and finding that states in which that
person receives a relatively high share of media mentions also receives a relatively
high share of votes in the most admired poll. This is a demanding specification
but a positive significant link remains. We have not established whether this link
is causal - it could run from admiration to media rather than the other way round.
But there does seem to be a robust link.
3.6 Conclusion
For 65 years since the late 1940s Gallup has, every December, asked Americans
about the living man and woman they most admire. This is perhaps the longest run
of consistent data on attitudes in any data set. In this chapter we have documented
the way in which the responses to this question have changed and argued that the
changing nature of responses to this question tells us something interesting about
the way in which society has been evolving. The pattern of responses in the 2010s
is (perhaps surprisingly) similar to those from the late 1940s with the most common
response being a current or ex-president or vice-president (with about one-quarter
of votes), followed by a sizeable group (again, almost one quarter) who say they
don’t know or admire no one. Other politicians, religious leaders and family and
friends are the next most common categories of response. Americans never have
and still do not often name celebrities and business people. But this similarity in
the beginning and the end hides considerable change in the intervening years with
a very marked collapse and then recovery in the vote share of the president and
vice-president.
We have drawn on the disparate literature on admiration to argue on theoreti-
cal grounds that admiration data is likely to tell us something about the types of
people and actions that are viewed positively so is likely to be informative about
levels of social capital in general and trust in particular, both trust in government
and generalized trust. We provide empirical support for this hypothesis using the
Almond-Verba data from 1960 that asks about both trust and admiration and the
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ANES and GSS surveys to highlight the cross-sectional and time-series variation in
the trust and admiration. We conclude that admiring a president or vice-president
is a good measure of trust in government and admiring no-one a good measure of
generalized distrust. Using this link we can say something about the evolution of
trust back to the late 1940s before we have reliable other sources of data. We argue
that trust in government was high from the late 1940s though peaked about 1960.
Finally, the chapter investigates the link between admiration and media men-
tions. We show that people who receive a relatively large number of mentions in
newspapers in a particular year and state are also more likely to be admired to
people in that year and state. Whether this relationship is causal is left for further
research.
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Table 3.1: Most Admired Male and Female, 1947-2013
Year Admired Male Vote Share Admired Female Vote Share
1947 Eleanor Roosevelt 0.29
1948 Harry Truman 0.22 Eleanor Roosevelt 0.30
1949 Dwight Eisenhower 0.12 Eleanor Roosevelt 0.32
1951 General Douglas Mcarthur 0.21
1952 Dwight Eisenhower 0.26 Eleanor Roosevelt 0.30
1954 Dwight Eisenhower 0.27 Eleanor Roosevelt 0.27
1955 Dwight Eisenhower 0.26 Eleanor Roosevelt 0.25
1958 Dwight Eisenhower 0.22 Eleanor Roosevelt 0.26
1961 John F Kennedy 0.23 Eleanor Roosevelt 0.31
1963 Lyndon Johnson 0.21 Jacqueline Kennedy 0.53
1965 Lyndon Johnson 0.19 Jacqueline Kennedy 0.36
1966 Lyndon Johnson 0.14 Jacqueline Kennedy 0.24
1967 Dwight Eisenhower 0.12
1970 Richard Nixon 0.10 Mamie Eisenhower 0.06
1971 Billy Graham 0.09 Golda Meir 0.11
1972 Richard Nixon 0.11 Pat Nixon 0.09
1973 Henry Kissinger 0.11 Golda Meir 0.17
1974 Henry Kissinger 0.16 Golda Meir 0.10
1977 Anwar Sadat 0.10 Golda Meir 0.06
1978 Jimmy Carter 0.09 Betty Ford 0.09
1979 Pope John Paul II 0.12 Rosalyn Carter 0.08
1980 Pope John Paul II 0.08 Mother Teresa 0.06
1981 Ronald Reagan 0.20 Mother Teresa 0.06
1982 Ronald Reagan 0.15 Margaret Thatcher 0.09
1983 Ronald Reagan 0.20 Margaret Thatcher 0.12
1984 Ronald Reagan 0.12 Margaret Thatcher 0.16
1985 Ronald Reagan 0.17 Margaret Thatcher 0.11
1987 Ronald Reagan 0.11 Mother Teresa 0.14
1988 Ronald Reagan 0.20 Mother Teresa 0.13
1989 George H W Bush 0.14 Margaret Thatcher 0.13
1990 George H W Bush 0.17 Margaret Thatcher 0.25
1992 George H W Bush 0.10 Mother Teresa 0.13
1994 Bill Clinton 0.09 Mother Teresa 0.12
1995 Bill Clinton 0.12 Mother Teresa 0.15
1996 Bill Clinton 0.13 Mother Teresa 0.22
1997 Bill Clinton 0.10 Hillary Clinton 0.10
1998 Bill Clinton 0.12 Hillary Clinton 0.24
2000 Bill Clinton 0.07 Hillary Clinton 0.19
2001 George W Bush 0.38 Laura Bush 0.12
2002 George W Bush 0.27 Hillary Clinton 0.07
2003 George W Bush 0.29 Hillary Clinton 0.16
2004 George W Bush 0.25 Hillary Clinton 0.13
2005 George W Bush 0.21 Condoleezza Rice 0.13
2007 George W Bush 0.10 Hillary Clinton 0.16
2008 Barack Obama 0.30 Hillary Clinton 0.19
2009 Barack Obama 0.28 Hillary Clinton 0.18
2010 Barack Obama 0.21 Hillary Clinton 0.18
2011 Barack Obama 0.17 Hillary Clinton 0.21
2012 Barack Obama 0.29 Hillary Clinton 0.25
2013 Barack Obama 0.15 Hillary Clinton 0.16
Note: This table reports vote shares based on first response only. The
category Family and Friends was ranked first in the years 1980 for Most
Admired Males and 1977, 1980, 1981 and 1982 for the Most Admired Female.
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Table 3.2: Major Classification Most Admired Male, by Decades
Decade
Group (First Response Adjusted) Total 1948-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2013
Academics and Experts 0.91 0.81 1.28 0.00 2.39 0.33 0.32
Business Persons 0.94 0.64 0.00 0.00 2.44 1.97 1.24
Don’t Know/ No One 27.13 21.15 24.19 32.35 30.60 30.94 25.26
Friends & Family 4.31 1.38 3.13 4.42 6.59 6.70 4.48
International Political Leader 4.51 8.42 4.22 3.65 4.16 3.88 3.33
Media, Artists, Sports 0.62 1.42 0.00 0.60 0.38 0.65 0.99
Other Politicians 7.27 13.01 6.74 12.25 3.12 3.88 4.64
Religious Leaders 9.09 7.48 8.94 11.06 10.94 8.90 7.09
Royalty 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
USA President or Vice 25.78 33.20 33.40 15.02 18.06 18.75 31.60
Unidentified 19.42 12.50 18.11 20.64 21.25 24.01 21.05
Group (First Response)
Academics and Experts 1.77 3.16 2.65 0.79 2.55 0.72 0.39
Business Persons 1.15 1.14 0.17 0.26 2.44 2.23 1.42
Don’t Know/ No One 27.13 21.15 24.19 32.35 30.60 30.94 25.26
Friends & Family 4.33 1.46 3.17 4.42 6.59 6.70 4.48
International Political Leader 5.16 8.91 5.68 4.54 4.43 4.11 3.47
Media, Artists, Sports 1.98 2.56 1.46 2.48 2.33 1.36 1.68
Other Politicians 9.22 14.81 10.26 14.84 4.56 4.40 5.45
Religious Leaders 9.71 8.15 9.96 11.91 11.11 8.94 7.69
Royalty 0.08 0.23 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.06
USA President or Vice 26.40 33.71 34.56 15.51 18.68 18.86 32.04
Unidentified 13.06 4.73 7.85 12.82 16.62 21.74 18.05
Group (First & Second Response)
Academics and Experts 1.07 2.71 0.42 0.18 0.00
Business Persons 1.08 0.17 0.26 2.44 2.23
Don’t Know/ No One 29.00 24.19 32.35 30.60 31.36
Friends & Family 4.90 3.17 4.42 6.59 6.70
International Political Leade 4.83r 5.68 4.54 4.43 4.11
Media, Artists, Sports 1.87 1.46 2.48 2.07 1.36
Other Politicians 10.51 11.32 16.12 6.93 5.12
Religious Leaders 10.66 9.90 11.91 11.38 8.94
Royalty 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.00
USA President or Vice 22.65 33.50 14.61 18.68 18.86
Unidentified 13.37 7.85 12.82 16.62 21.32
Note: This table reports vote shares by decades and major classification. The first panel reports vote shares for first
response, restricting number of named individuals to 13 a year (the rest are classified as unidentified). The second
panel reports vote shares for first response without any adjustment. The third panel includes second responses (years
prior to 1960 are excluded as the question is not asked and after 1999 when a change in the routing means there are
very few second responses).
100
Table 3.3: Major Classification Most Admired Female, by Decades
Decade
Group (First Response Adjusted) Total 1948-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2013
Academics and Experts 4.41 5.02 1.58 1.43 9.88 10.85 1.39
Don’t Know/ No One 33.59 35.90 32.39 41.55 32.95 29.36 28.70
Friends & Family 5.92 2.52 4.73 6.15 7.59 8.26 6.79
International Political Leader 6.23 3.66 2.42 9.98 11.83 7.55 2.99
Media, Artists, Sports 3.37 4.23 1.08 1.93 1.98 3.34 7.76
Other Politicians 6.17 5.41 2.55 2.88 4.67 1.49 17.36
Relative of Politicians 22.14 31.61 42.73 16.15 8.53 15.02 14.55
Religious Leaders 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Royalty 1.84 3.45 2.35 0.56 1.61 2.95 0.90
Unidentified 16.32 8.13 10.16 19.37 20.95 21.18 19.55
Group (First Response)
Academics and Experts 4.99 5.82 1.75 3.01 10.60 10.92 1.47
Business Persons 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.20
Don’t Know/ No One 33.59 35.90 32.39 41.55 32.95 29.36 28.70
Friends & Family 6.03 2.52 4.81 6.15 7.59 8.26 7.28
International Political Leader 6.57 3.78 3.03 10.33 12.47 7.64 3.08
Media, Artists, Sports 5.43 6.30 3.53 5.01 4.54 4.02 8.74
Other Politicians 7.15 5.86 2.93 4.67 6.55 2.30 17.94
Relative of Politicians 22.91 31.99 43.17 17.28 10.14 15.29 15.14
Religious Leaders 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Royalty 2.25 3.83 2.71 1.24 2.13 3.18 1.13
Unidentified 10.98 3.76 5.67 10.72 12.99 19.02 16.32
Group (First & Second Response)
Academics and Experts 5.84 1.75 3.01 10.60 10.92
Business Persons 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
Don’t Know/ No One 34.52 32.39 41.55 32.95 29.36
Friends & Family 6.44 4.81 6.15 7.59 8.26
International Political Leader 8.20 3.03 10.33 12.47 7.64
Media, Artists, Sports 4.27 3.53 5.01 4.54 4.02
Other Politicians 4.27 2.93 4.67 6.55 2.30
Relative of Politicians 23.21 43.17 17.28 10.14 15.29
Religious Leaders 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
Royalty 2.23 2.71 1.24 2.13 3.18
Unidentified 10.99 5.67 10.72 12.99 19.02
Note: This table reports vote shares by decades and major classification. The first panel reports vote shares for first
response, restricting number of named individuals to 11 a year (the rest are classified as unidentified). The second
panel reports vote shares for first response without any adjustment. The third panel includes second responses (years
prior to 1960 are excluded as the question is not asked and after 1999 when a change in the routing means there are
very few second responses).
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Table 3.4: Civic Culture - Admiration and Trust
Country
Major Classification Germany Italy Mexico UK USA Total USAGallup
All Others 9.15 9.74 6.35 19.73 10.82 11.10 30.33
Don’t Know/ No One 44.42 36.75 38.19 24.51 22.06 33.29 21.35
Entertainment 34.77 25.97 32.54 30.84 22.68 29.42 3.91
Politicians 11.66 27.54 22.92 24.92 44.43 26.19 44.41
Trust I - Some people say that most people can be trusted. How do you feel about it?
Diagree 92.38 80.28 69.80 49.63 44.41 67.23
Agree 7.62 19.72 30.20 50.37 55.59 32.77
Trust II - If you don’t watch yourself people will take advantage of you.
Agree 82.47 86.67 95.34 77.38 69.76 82.43
Disagree 17.53 13.33 4.66 22.62 30.24 17.57
Trust III - Human nature is fundamentally cooperative
Disagree 21.93 31.04 12.75 12.73 14.46 18.01
Agree 78.07 68.96 87.25 87.27 85.54 81.99
Note: This table reports the relationship between admiration and trust based on the
Almond-Verba (1963) Civic Culture Study across 5 countries for the years 1958 for Ger-
many, Italy, Mexico and UK and 1960 for the USA. Data in Column (USAGallup) is ob-
tained from the Gallup Opinion Poll and pertains to the years1958 and 1960 for the most
admired man. Entertainment category for Gallup includes persons in News, Media, Sports,
Artists, Experts, Academics and Business Persons. All Others category for Gallup includes
International Political Leaders, Religious Figures, Royalty, Family and Unidentified persons.
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Table 3.5: Civic Culture - Admiration and Trust
Major Classification
All Others Don’t Know/ No One Entertainment Politicians Total
Trust I - Some people say that most people can be trusted. How do you feel about it?
Diagree 55.77 56.13 42.01 37.12 44.41
Agree 44.23 43.87 57.99 62.88 55.59
Trust II - If you don’t watch yourself people will take advantage of you.
Diagree 71.15 81.07 71.50 62.89 69.76
Agree 28.85 18.93 28.50 37.11 30.24
Trust III - Human nature is fundamentally cooperative
Diagree 18.28 15.93 15.02 12.68 14.46
Agree 81.72 84.07 84.98 87.32 85.54
Most Admired Quality
Active in public and social affairs 4.76 3.50 5.23 6.84 5.52
Ambitious 7.14 11.45 12.27 10.79 10.88
Does his job well 15.71 17.99 17.95 13.57 15.77
Don’t know 2.38 2.34 0.91 0.70 1.29
Generous 28.57 21.50 30.45 33.41 29.59
Keeps himself to himself 15.24 20.33 12.05 12.65 14.48
Lets no one take advantage of him 4.29 2.57 3.41 1.97 2.68
Other 0.48 0.70 0.23 1.04 0.72
Respectful 16.67 13.32 13.86 15.43 14.74
Thrifty 4.76 6.31 3.64 3.60 4.33
Note: This table reports the relationship between admiration, trust and character qualities that are admired for
the US sample. The data is based on the Almond-Verba (1963) Civic Culture Study across 5 countries.
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Table 3.6: Admiration and Trust
Civic Survey Gallup Survey
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Admire Someone Ppl can be Trusted Ppl Don’t Take Adv. of You Ppl are Cooperative Admire Male Admire Female
Non White -0.012 -0.332*** -0.171*** 0.008 -0.062*** 0.160***
(0.054) (0.063) (0.050) (0.051) (0.023) (0.023)
Age -0.000 -0.003** -0.003** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.029 -0.017 -0.065* -0.002 -0.002 -0.099***
(0.032) (0.038) (0.036) (0.028) (0.012) (0.014)
Ommitted Category: Republicans
Democrat 0.030 -0.040 -0.083* -0.066* -0.058*** 0.115***
(0.040) (0.046) (0.044) (0.035) (0.014) (0.017)
Other Party 0.069 0.025 0.017 -0.011 -0.093*** 0.011
(0.043) (0.054) (0.055) (0.038) (0.017) (0.021)
College 0.080** 0.152*** 0.182*** -0.002 0.078*** 0.141***
(0.037) (0.046) (0.050) (0.034) (0.014) (0.017)
Year FE . . . . Yes Yes
Beta Proportionality Test . 2.97 3.65 0.20 . .
Residual Correlation 1 0.12 0.09 -0.03 . .
Mean .793 .583 .319 .866 .793 .614
Observations 646 643 630 611 4392 4392
Note: This table presents regression analysis between trust and admiration. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. All regressions include Region fixed effects. The
dependent variable in the column 1 to 4 is from the Civic Culture study pertaining to year 1960, while the dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is from the Gallup
Opinion Poll for the years 1958 and 1961. Dependent variables in all regressions are indicator variables taking the value 1 or 0. Non White is a dummy variable for
race, Age is measured in years, Male is a dummy variable for gender, Democrat and Other Party are dummy variables for respondents political preferences (relative
to being Republican) and college is a dummy variable for having some years of post-secondary education. The beta proportionality test reports the chi-square
statistic. For consistency with other trust measures, the dependant variable in column (3) is the inverse of the question.
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Table 3.7: Admiration and Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust-GSS Trust-ANES FedTrust-GSS FedTrust-ANES Most Admired Male Most Admired Female
All Others President Vice Don’t Know All Others Relative of Politicians Don’t Know
Non White -0.196*** -0.268*** 0.014** -0.087*** 0.037 -0.098 0.000 0.248*** 0.082 0.000
(0.006) (0.02) (0.007) (0.014) (0.063) (0.077) (.) (0.072) (0.108) (.)
Age 0.003*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.005*** 0.005*** 0.000 -0.005*** -0.002 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (.) (0.001) (0.001) (.)
Male 0.038*** 0.035*** -0.027*** 0.013** 0.036 0.031 0.000 -0.118*** -0.505*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.024) (0.032) (.) (0.025) (0.04) (.)
Ommitted Category: Protestants
Catholic -0.010 0.006 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.171*** -0.048 0.000 0.121*** 0.214*** 0.000
(0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.051) (0.064) (.) (0.038) (0.058) (.)
Jewish -0.030 0.021 -0.006 -0.010 0.153 -0.298** 0.000 0.200** 0.477*** 0.000
(0.020) (0.028) (0.017) (0.015) (0.118) (0.13) (.) ) (0.09) (0.076) (.)
Other and None -0.016 -0.013 0.011 -0.059*** -0.228*** -0.452*** 0.000 -0.170*** -0.432*** 0.000
(0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.045) (0.049) (.) ) (0.046) (0.073) (.)
Ommitted Category: Republicans
Democrat 0.002 -0.012 0.147*** 0.107*** -0.065 0.185** 0.000 -0.012 0.693*** 0.000
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.076) (0.082) (.) ) (0.048) (0.066) (.)
Other Party -0.040*** -0.046** -0.002 0.010 -0.157** -0.213*** 0.000 -0.120** 0.329*** 0.000
(0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.063) (0.078) (.) ) (0.053) (0.081) (.)
Democrat x Republican -0.033*** -0.024 -0.345*** -0.195*** 0.085 -1.320*** 0.000 -0.049 -0.831*** 0.000
(0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.087) (0.108) (.) ) (0.064) (0.083) (.)
Other Party x Republican -0.012 0.013 -0.121*** -0.103*** 0.023 -0.786*** 0.000 0.029 -0.741*** 0.000
(0.014) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013) (0.066) (0.094) (.) ) (0.050) (0.076) (.)
College 0.188*** 0.205*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.500*** 0.231*** 0.000 0.577*** 0.222*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.038) (0.057) (.) ) (0.030) (0.042) (.)
Beta Correlation
Trust People GSS 1.00 0.88 0.26 0.33 0.00 0.18 -0.25 0.03 0.01 -0.06
Trust People ANES 1.00 0.13 0.30 0.12 0.11 -0.31 0.23 -0.10 -0.20
Trust Gov GSS 1.00 0.69 -0.34 0.46 -0.24 -0.44 0.52 -0.07
Trust Gov ANES 1.00 -0.30 0.47 -0.30 -0.25 0.34 -0.11
Observations 34062 15440 37188 28120 51946 51946 51946 51863 51863 51863
Note: This table presents regression analysis between trust and admiration for a longer time period. The data is obtained from the General Social Survey, Annual National Electoral Survey and
Gallup Opinion Polls. The data spans from 1972-2012, 1964-2008 and 1948-2013 respectively. All regressions control for region and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors applied for ANES
sample. Standard errors clustered at the state level for the rest of the regressions. Linear probability models estimated for columns (1) to (4), while multinomial logit specification estimated
for columns (5) and (6) with referent category as Don’t Know. Non White is a dummy variable for race, Age is measured in years, Male is a dummy variable for gender, Catholic, Jewish and
Other and None are dummy variables for religious affiliation (relative to Protestants), Democrat and Other Party are dummy variables for respondents political preferences (relative to being
Republican), Democrat/ Other Party X Republican is an interaction between respondent’s political preference and if the sitting President is a Republican and college is a dummy variable for
having some years of post-secondary education. The beta proportionality test reports the chi-square statistic. Trust in Federal Government in the GSS sample is a measure of confidence in the
Executive branch of Federal Government. Beta correlations are correlations between the predicted values across the regressions.
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Figure 3.1: Most Admired Male - All data
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired male over time. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.2: Most Admired Female - All data
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired female over time. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.3: Most Admired Male
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired male based on first response only. The solid line is a 5-year moving average. Source:
Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.4: Most Admired Female
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired female based on first response only. The solid line is a 5-year moving average. Source:
Gallup Opinion Poll, 1948-2013.
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Figure 3.5: Admiration of the President/Vice and Trust in Federal Government ANES
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for the president or the vice president based on first response only and the fraction of people with trust
in the Government. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll and Annual National Electoral Survey.
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Figure 3.6: Admiration of the President/Vice and Trust in Federal Government GSS
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for the president or the vice president based on first response only and the fraction of people with trust
in the Government. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll and Generalised Social Survey.
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Figure 3.7: Admiration of No-One and Trust in People
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for reporting admiring ‘no-one’ based on first response only and the fraction of people with trust in
other people. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll, Annual National Electoral Survey and General Social Survey.
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Table 3.8: Summary Statistics for Media Analysis
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Mentions 0.75 2.809 0 86 37945
Avg. No. of Resp. 48.241 54.208 1 453 37945
News presence 0 1 -0.641 20.706 37945
Age 59.958 13.962 21 97 37945
Non White 0.152 0.359 0 1 37945
Note: This table reports summary statistics for data used in the media analysis. Mentions is the
average number of times a name is mentioned across newspapers in state s and year t. Avg. No.
Of Resp. is the average number of respondents during the Gallup survey in in state s and year t.
News presence is constructed by scaling the mentions by the number of times the most common 4
letterwords (‘that’ and ‘would’) apper in the newspapers in state s and year t. The measure is
further standard normalized for ease of interpretation. Age is measured in years and Non White is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the most admired person is not white and 0 otherwise. Source: Gallup
Opinion Polls and Newspaperarchieve.com
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Figure 3.8: Media and Admiration, by Gender 1949-2012
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for the most admired male based on first response only. Media share is defined as the total name
count of most admired persons in the newspapers across the US, scaled by the total number of times the most common 4 letter words (‘that’ and
‘would’) appear in the newspapers. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll, Newspaperarchieve.com and authors calculations.
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Table 3.9: Influence of Media on Most Admired Male - Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
News presence 0.264*** 0.272*** 0.263*** 0.270*** 0.282*** 0.075*** 0.026***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009)
Age 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.331** -0.208***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.159) (0.076)
Non White -0.200*** -0.299*** -0.300*** -0.299*** 7.985 -13.487***
(0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (6.275) (3.233)
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes .
Region FE No No No Yes . . .
State FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Name FE No No No No No Yes .
Name Year FE No No No No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable .75 .75 .75 .75 .75 .75 .75
Observations 37945 37945 37945 37945 37945 37945 37945
Note: This table reports the relationship between newspaper presence and share of votes the most admired
person gets. The dependent variable is the frequency of votes the most admired person got in state s
and year t. News presence is the frequency of mentions the most admired person got in state s in year
t, normalized by the average times ‘that’ and ‘would’ appear in the newspapers in state s and year t. All
regressions have been offset by the total number of respondents in state s in year t to account for differential
sampling. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis clustered by state.
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Table 3.A.1: Gallup Questionnaire Summary
Survey Details Response Groupings
year Q All M 2nd
Resp
M
F 2nd
Resp
F
No
of
coded
M
No
of
coded
F
Un
M
Un
F
Misc,
Other
Dec DK NO DK,
NA
NA/
Blank
DK,
NA,
None
Dec,
DK,
NA,
Blank
Dec,
DK,
NA,
None
ND/
No
2nd
Men-
tion
Ref Un
1946 1 X 425 45 X X
1947 1 X 27 X X
1947 2 X 203 X X X
1948 2 X X 14 19 4 1 X X
1949 2 X X 18 18 1 X X X X
1950
1951 2 X 31 2 X X X
1952 2 X X 144 95 2 X X X X
1953
1954 2 X X 20 11 13 X X
1955 2 X X 37 19 2 X X
1956
1957
1958 2 X X 43 32 X X X X
1959
1960 2 X X X X 26 14 X X X
1961 2 X X X X 95 66 3 X X X
1962
1963 2 X X X X 63 30 1 X X
1964
Continued on next page
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1965 2 X X X X 67 58 X X
1966 2 X X X X 73 61 X X X
1967 2 X X X X 83 25 X X X
1968
1969 3 X X 20 X X
1970 2 X X X X 70 40 X X X
1971 2 X X X X 81 55 X X X
1972 2 X X X X 83 55 X X
1973 2 X X X X 87 60 X X
1974 2 X X X X 76 58 X X
1975 2 X X X X 86 61 1 X X
1976 4 X
1977 2 X X X X 24 22 X X X
1978 2 X X X X 26 25 X X X
1979 2 X X X X 27 25 X X X
1980 2 X X X X 29 27 X X X
1981 2 X X X X 28 31 X X X
1982 2 X X X X 34 34 X X X
1983 2 X X X X 34 34 X X X
1984 2 X X X X 41 39 X X X
1985 2 X X X X 46 41 X X X
1986
1987 2 X X X X 33 43 1 X X X
1988 2 X X X X 32 33 X X X
1989 2 X X X X 14 18 X X X
1990 2 X X X X 13 19 X X X
1991
1992 2 X X X X 21 21 X X X X
1993 2 X X X X 23 23 X X X X
Continued on next page
118
1994 2 X X X X 16 19 4 X X X X
1995 2 X X X X 18 19 1 X X X X
1996 2 X X X X 20 18 X X X X
1997 2 X X X X 19 21 X X X X
1998 2 X X X X 19 19 X X X X
1999 5 X
2000 2 X X X X 20 15 X X X X
2001 2 X X X X 18 15 X X X X
2002 2 X X X X 20 19 X X X X
2003 2 X X X X 19 15 X X X X
2004 2 X X X X 22 19 X X X X X
2005 2 X X X X 22 22 X X X X
2006
2007 2 X X X X 27 17 X X X X X
2008 2 X X X X 25 19 X X X X X
2009 2 X X X X 29 20 X X X X X
2010 2 X X X X 31 24 X X X X X
2011 2 X X X X 35 25 X X X X X
Note: This table provides a summary of the surveys questionnaires carried out by Gallup since 1947. Response grouping identifies the categories that have been used to code the survey in different years. Survey statistics provide some general descriptives
regarding the most admired male question. Column Q identifies the type of question asked in each survey year. 1.What person living today in any part of the world that you have heard or read about do you admire the most? 2. What man/ woman living today in
any part of the world, that you have heard or read about, do you admire the most? 3. Here is a list of 20 women. Which one of them would you say you admire the most? 4. Here is a list of prominent women. Would you tell me which three of these women you
admire the most? 5. Now I’m going to read you a list of people who have lived this century. For each one, please tell me if you consider that person to one of the people you admire MOST from this century, a person you admire, but not the MOST, a person you
somewhat admire, or someone you do not admire at all. First, ... How about ... M stands for males, F stands for femailes, Un stands for Unidentified, Dec stands for decesed, DK stands for don’t know, NO stands for no-one, NA stands for no answer, ND stands
for no data and Ref stands for refused to answer.
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Figure 3.A.1: All Other Males
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Note: This figure plots the distribution of share of votes for the all other category based on first responses adjusted data (i.e persons with rank
greater than 13 are grouped under all others). Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.2: All Other Females
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Note: This figure plots the distribution of share of votes for the all other category based on first responses adjusted data (i.e persons with rank
greater than 11 are grouped under all others). Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.3: Most Admired Male, by Gender
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired male over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.4: Most Admired Male, by Political Affiliation
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired male over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.5: Most Admired Male, by Race
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired male over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.6: Most Admired Male, by Region of Residence
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired male over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.7: Most Admired Male, by Urban Status
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired male over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll
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Figure 3.A.8: Most Admired Male, by Marriage Status
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired male over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.9: Most Admired Male, by Birth Cohort
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired male over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.10: Most Admired Female, by Gender
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired female over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.11: Most Admired Female, by Political Affiliation
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired female over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.12: Most Admired Female, by Race
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired female over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.13: Most Admired Female, by Region of Residence
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired female over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.14: Most Admired Female, by Urban Status
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired female over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.15: Most Admired Female, by Marriage Status
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired female over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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Figure 3.A.16: Most Admired Female, by Birth Cohort
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Note: This figure plots the share of votes for most admired female over time by respondent characteristics. Source: Gallup Opinion Poll.
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